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ARTICLES
OUTSOURCING IMMIGRATION COMPLIANCE
EleanorMarie Lawrence Brown *
Immigration is a hot-button issue about which Americans have sent a
clear message. They prefer not to admit more aliens until the government
is able to screen credibly for entrants who will abide by the terms of
admission and sanction those who do not. While immigration debates now
focus almost entirely on undocumented workers, they have overshadowed
another critical,yet poorly understood, challenge: designing institutions to
screen properly for aliens who are visa-compliant and sanction
noncompliant aliens.
Because failed guest worker programs
unquestionably increase the size of the undocumented population, this
Article addresses the difficulty of institutional design by analyzing the
highly controversial guest worker provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. This Article presents original data from a study of visacompliance decisions of Jamaicanswho work in Canada under a program
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in which screening is precise, sanctioning is effective, and compliance is
high. On the basis of this study, this comparative immigration law project
contends that the United States should partially outsource screening and
sanctioning to source-laborcountries.
This Article critiques the historical uninationalapproach to immigration
law. This approach fails to recognize that there are critical asymmetries
between the United States and the countriesfrom which aliens originate in
their capacity to gather information about potential entrants and to
sanction visa violators. This recognition leads to the following insight:
source-labor countries are often better placed to screen because they can
access accurate information about potential entrants from their
communities. Source-labor countries are also often well-placed to deter
noncompliance because, through collective sanctioning, they can influence
communities of origin to persuade their members to abide by visa terms.
The criminal law scholarship regularly recognizes the impact of norms on
deterring crimes; this ethnographic study suggests that the same may be
true with respect to immigration violations. This Article contends that
aliens are more likely to be compliant so long as the authorities design
legal rules that augment compliance norms alreadypresent in source-labor
communities and incentivize community members to reinforce them.
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INTRODUCTION
Anywhere you turn, macca jook yu.1

A majority of Americans cite immigration as a leading issue, 2 just behind
the economy, national security, and health care, with many Americans
citing disrespect for the law by undocumented aliens as their primary
concern. 3 Yet this urgency is not reflected in the law review literature,
which has largely failed to address the "disconnect" between goals and

1. "Anywhere you turn you will be stuck by thorns." This is a Jamaican proverb that is
sometimes utilized to capture the sentiment that it is often an exercise in futility to create
incentives for persons to play by the rules. DICTIONARY OF JAMAICAN ENGLISH 252, 284 (F.
G. CASSIDY & R. B. LE PAGE eds., 2d ed. 2002) (providing definitions of the words).
2. Joseph Carroll, Iraq, Economy, Healthcare,Immigration Top Vote Issues, GALLUP,
Dec. 10, 2007, http://www.gallup.com/poll/103132/Iraq-Economy-Healthcare-ImmigrationTop-Vote-Issues.aspx.
3. The reader should be aware that the guest worker programs that are the subject of
this Article raise profound questions of justice. There is an ongoing and well-documented
tension between the state's interest in the provision of low-cost labor and its concern with
the protection of human rights more generally and ideal citizenship in particular. These
concerns include but are not limited to the following: whether the presence of a large-scale
population of temporary guests institutionalizes the exclusion of noncitizens from the
constitutional mainstream, undermines political community, and denigrates the value of
citizenship; whether these programs undermine wages and workplace protections for both
guests and native workers; and whether such programs legitimate the application of a
broader "trade paradigm" to human beings that commodifies labor. Moreover, under the
specific proposal contained in this Article, justice concerns would be arguably augmented by
the high dependence of the United States on a non-U.S. actor. The question necessarily
arises: can the United States expect a source-labor country to reliably incorporate human
rights and antidiscrimination norms into administration of the program? I am fully cognizant
of these concerns, which provide fertile ground for further work and will be given a full
hearing in a later paper. The following is a partial list of references that address these
concerns. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 56-61 (1983) (opposing guest worker programs on the grounds that they do not

conform to the liberal egalitarian principles that govern full membership in a just state); see
also CANADIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY: EXEMPLARY ESSAYS

(R. Beiner and W. Norman eds., 2000); JOSEPH H. CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND
COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION OF JUSTICE AS EVENHANDEDNESS (2000); DUAL
NATIONALITY, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE: THE

REINVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP (Randall Hansen & Patrick Weil eds., 2002); Louis Michael
Seidman, Fear and Loathing at the Border, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 136, 140 (Warren F.
Schwartz ed., 1995); James Woodward, Commentary: Liberalism and Migration, in FREE
MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY

59, 82 (Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992). For a discussion of the impact of lowskilled alien workers on wages of citizen workers, see generally GEORGE BORJAS, FRIENDS
OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (1990) (noting the
disproportionate impact on the most disadvantaged, including urban residents and African
Americans). For broadly skeptical discussions of guest worker programs in the legal
scholarship, see HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING:

THE LOST STORY OF

IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 15-37 (2006). For skeptical but more
targeted critiques of guest worker programs (in their current configuration), see Jennifer
Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007); Cristina M.
Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and
Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219.
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outcomes in immigration law. 4 The goal of immigration law is to ensure
that aliens receive pre-entry screening and be sanctioned if they side-step
that screening. 5 The outcome, in sharp contrast, involves the de facto
permanent residence of twelve million undocumented persons, the6
overwhelming majority of whom have never been screened or sanctioned.
Immigration debates now focus almost entirely on undocumented workers,
obscuring another crucial but underexamined immigration difficulty:
questions of institutional design. Given that failures in the design and
conduct of guest worker programs clearly increase the size of the
undocumented population, this Article addresses the challenges of
designing effective institutions through 7the guest worker provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

4. This point has been made by Peter Schuck. See Peter H. Schuck, The Disconnect
Between Public Attitudes and Policy Outcomes in Immigration, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION
17 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007). Hiroshi Motomura has argued that this disconnect has
received little attention in the law review literature because of the conventional emphasis on
the postentry treatment of aliens. Hiroshi Motomura, Comment, Choosing Immigrants,
Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV. 857 (2007). This emphasis arises at least partially from
the fact that aliens have virtually no legal personhood outside the United States, with limited
access to constitutional protections. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1954);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S.
279, 292 (1904). As such, the law review literature has been disproportionately focused on
the treatment of aliens once they arrive in the United States. The primary exception to this
scholarly silence on the pre-entry screening is Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The SecondOrder Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2007).
5. See U.S. COMM. ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING CREDIBILITY (1994), available at http://www.utexas.
edu/lbj/uscir/exesum94.pdf.
6. This figure is taken from the work of Douglas Massey, a leading authority on the
size of the undocumented population. See Douglas S. Massey, Borderline Madness:
America's CounterproductiveImmigration Policy, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION, supra note 4,
at 129. Estimates generally indicate that there are between ten and fourteen million
undocumented persons in the United States. See DAVID A. MARTIN, MIGRATION POL'Y INST.,
TWILIGHT STATUSES: A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION (2005);
JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEw HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS:
NUMBERS AND
CHARACTERISTICS 3 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf.
7. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(H) (2006) (guest worker provisions). Failed guest worker
programs are a primary contributor to the size of the undocumented population in several
developed countries. The World Bank has argued in a recent annual report devoted to
migration that worldwide labor mobility trends will lead guest worker programs to remain at
the center of contentious political debates worldwide. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS 2006: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION 72 (2009).
Nowhere is this observation truer than in the United States, the world's largest importer of
unskilled persons. See Philip L. Martin, Economic Integration and Migration: The Case of
NAFTA, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 419, 437 (1998). See generally LANT
PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE COME: BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK ON GLOBAL LABOR
MOBILITY (2006). In the last three decades, the population of migrants in high income
countries has doubled, registering an annual growth rate of 3%. WORLD BANK, supra, at 2627. Migrants now constitute nearly 2.9% of the population worldwide, and 8.3% of the
population of industrialized countries. Id. Over 90% of these migrants are low-skilled
persons who would typically only qualify for legal entry into developed countries as guest
workers. Id. at 43.
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The widely publicized political backlash that accompanied President
George W. Bush's recent proposal 8 to expand the guest worker program
sent a clear message. 9 There will be no program expansion until the
government is able to credibly screen for temporary workers and sanction
those who do not comply with the terms of admission. If the criminal law
is any guide for immigration law, the public demand for a tough approach
to screening and sanctioning may stem from entrenched political and
psychological factors and is not likely to abate any time soon.10 While
there has been much hand-wringing in the law review literature about theI
increasingly blunt policies that have resulted from hardening attitudes,
there has been little discussion about the underlying problem that appears to
be fueling the public backlash-what can actually be done to screen for
aliens who will abide by the terms of their visas and to sanction those who
do not.
Traditionally, institutional design scholarship has faced a major
constraint-the influence of the dominant uninational conceptualization of
immigration law. This persists even in the face of a growing recognition
that aliens increasingly live transnational lives.12 The uninational approach
8. For a summary of the reform proposal, see Press Release, Office of the White House
Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform Act (Jan. 7, 2004), available
at http://web.archive.org/web/20040110025405/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004
/01/20040107-1 .html,
9. For a summary of the stakes involved for both Democrats and Republicans in the
highly contentious debate, see David Nitkin & Matthew Hay Brown, Bush's Push for
Compromise Is Greeted with Skepticism: PresidentEncounters Wary Democrats and Some
Republican Opposition, BALT. SUN, Feb. 2, 2007, at 2A; see also Kerry Howley, Guests in
the Machine, REASONONLINE, Jan. 2008, http://www.reason.com/news/show/123474.html
(describing the controversy engulfing the guest worker program, not only among legislators
but also more broadly).
"Give the Senate some credit," James Suroweicki wrote in the June 11 New
Yorker: "In shaping the current immigration-reform bill, it has come up with one
idea that almost everybody hates." Hates was an understatement. President
George W. Bush had been pushing for some sort of guest worker program since
before the 9/11 attacks, and as that idea inched closer to realization in 2007, his
critics grew more vitriolic. Right-wingers ... excoriated Bush for his starry-eyed
idealism, and left-wingers... came out against the entrance of hundreds of
thousands of new immigrants.
The New York Times complained that no worker should be sent home; National
Review complained that no worker would go home. The New Republic said the
plan fell within "the tradition of the African slave ship"....

Id.
10. Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political,Social, Psychological
and Other Non-legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal)Criminal Law, 1
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997).
11. Stephen Legomsky's work typifies this approach and provides a helpful summary of
other sympathetic views. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporationof CriminalJustice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007).
12. The transnational nature of the alien population is a major theme in the sociological
literature, but the law review literature generally appears not to have incorporated this
insight. For a summary of the transnationalism research, see Peggy Levitt, Salsa and
Ketchup: Transnational Migrants Straddle Two Worlds, in THE CONTEXTS READER,
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (Jeff Goodwin & James Jasper eds., 2008). I
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to immigration law reform focuses almost entirely on new federal
immigration law in the United States. Little energy is expended thinking
about binational intervention. This Article seeks to change that.
Although a primary goal of immigration law is to collect predictive
information about which aliens are likely to be desirable entrants, the
United States currently finds itself in the absurd position of screening aliens
utilizing poor information, with little reference to the countries from which
aliens originate, even as these countries often have better information about
their nationals.
In an effort to mitigate this clear informational
disadvantage, this Article contends that the United States should execute
bilateral arrangements with source-labor countries to partially outsource the
screening function. This Article also recognizes that source-labor countries
are also well-placed to aid in sanctioning noncompliant aliens, even when
those aliens are already on American soil, through their influence on
communities from which aliens originate. Thus, the United States also
stands to benefit from partially outsourcing the sanctioning function. Can
the United States expect other countries to reliably meet their screening and
sanctioning commitments? This Article argues that the answer is yes. In a
competitive globalized context in which developing countries prize the
access that their nationals have to the American labor market, the repeated
game-like nature of their interactions with the United States increases the
likelihood that source-labor countries will actually meet their commitments
and will incentivize their nationals to do the same.
This Article includes a comparative immigration law study of a Canadian
program for guest workers from Jamaica (Jamaica-Canada program). In
this particular program, screening appears to be precise, sanctioning is
effective, and compliance is high. This finding is striking against the
background of less successful compliance, among a similar population of
Jamaican guest workers in the United States. While the differences in
compliance rates may appear to be minor, they are hardly marginal when
viewed in the context of the large undocumented population, which is
comprised primarily of low-skilled persons who would typically only
qualify for entry as guest workers. Although this discussion focuses on
systemic differences in program design between the United States and
Canada as a possible explanatory factor, there are competing rationales for
the differential levels of visa compliance, and it is not possible to attribute
definitively these differences to program design without the benefit of
further research. Rather, this case study is meant to be the beginning of a
dialogue-a hook for a larger conversation with a focus on the reasons for
visa compliance as told by the guest workers themselves.
acknowledge that my utilization of the transnationalism concept is unconventional. The
sociology literature generally refers to transnational migrants as citizens and/or permanent
residents of two societies. However, the transnational lives of guest workers clearly raise
similar issues. Kim Barry has made a similar point in the context of citizenship theory. See
Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 11 (2006).
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In other areas of legal scholarship, ethnographic research has been
effectively used to aid interdisciplinary analyses of compliance and
deterrence.1 3 The aim of this Article is to use "on the ground" research to
shed light on similar questions of institutional design in the context of
immigration law. Through the lens of this research, this Article will
demonstrate why a continued uninational approach to immigration law
makes little sense.
This Article relies on three essential moves, which will be succinctly
referred to as (1) the information screening component; (2) the legal
compliance component; and (3) the collective sanctions component. The
information screening component argues that persons who are proximate to
visa applicants may be incentivized to share with officials inside
information as to which persons are likely to be law-abiding short-term
guests. The legal compliance component contends that, among the subjects
of this study, visa compliance is dominant even when they leave their home
countries because their communal norms prioritize visa compliance, and
they lose status in their communities if they deviate from these norms. The
collective sanctions component contends that astute officials utilize group
accountability rules to send signals to community members about the costs
associated with breaking immigration laws, which incentivize them to
enforce these norms.
Part I sets up the problem by providing a fuller discussion of the
difficulties associated with screening and sanctioning and a demonstration
of why current academic responses to these challenges are insufficient. Part
II offers a new approach that emphasizes outsourced prescreening and
outsourced norms-based sanctioning and then provides the empirical and
ethnographic evidence in support of such an approach. Part III explains
why this proposal works. More specifically, Part III focuses on the central
role played by the community screener. She functions as an "intermediary
in trust" who stands to lose her primary currency, namely, the credibility of
her advice, if those who she recommends abscond. Building on Richard
McAdams's esteem-based model and Eric Posner's signaling model of
norms promulgation, Part III also argues that, through the stigmatization of
visa violators, there is a persuasive case that governmental policy can
amplify visa-compliance norms in the communities from which guest
workers originate. Part IV addresses the elephants in the room, including
corruption, sui generis concerns about the relevance of the proposal to
13. For an article that summarizes a broad range of interdisciplinary writing on
compliance and deterrence issues, see Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology:
The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997). One such classic ethnographic
study, which has been highly influential in criminal law scholarship, is CLIFFORD R. SHAW &
HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS (1942). For an example of
the influence of this work, see Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law
Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1998). Another such influential study is ELIJAH
ANDERSON,

STREETWISE:

RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY (1990).

For an example of the utilization of this work, see Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law
and (Norms 0) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 805, 809-13 (1998).
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larger, less closely knit source-labor communities, and concerns
surrounding the applicability of the proposal to persons who lack access to
community networks to testify to their reliability. To mitigate this final
concern, this Article proposes self-selecting visa groups in which members
bear the risk of default of other members. Part IV also addresses a final
concern. Under the broader proposal, the United States would essentially
be retaining a foreign government to act as its agent-a highly controversial
policy in the current political context. This section makes the case that
governments with high degrees of dependence on the United States will
have minimal incentives to breach since the costs of defection are high.
I. THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF IMMIGRATION LAW REFORM: SCREENING
FOR SHORT-TERM TYPE AND SANCTIONING DEFECTORS

A. A Tale of Impossibility
14
There is nothing more permanent than temporary workers.

At the center of the recent highly divisive deliberations over
comprehensive immigration reform was a program to reform the guest
worker provisions of the LNA 15 by significantly increasing the number of
16
guest workers and allowing them to work in a wide range of sectors.
President George W. Bush was the primary advocate of the reform
proposal, emphasizing that his support was contingent on the temporary
tenure of guests. 17 The proposal did not receive broad support in Congress,
where it spawned a plethora of counterproposals. 18 Indeed, given the
controversy surrounding the immigration issue, the critique of the guest
14. For a widely cited quasi-academic discussion of the challenges of sanctioning, see
Philip L. Martin & Michael S. Teitelbaum, The Mirage of Mexican Guest Workers, 80
FOREIGN AFF. 117, 131 (2001). See also Martin, supra note 7.
15. 8 U.S.C. § l10 1(a)(15)(H) (2006).
16. For the key provisions of the guest worker reform proposal, see Press Release,
Office of the White House Press Sec'y, supranote 8.
17. Id.; see also Press Release, The White House, President Signs Homeland Security
Appropriation Act for 2006 (Oct. 18, 2005), availableat http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/hls/
WH/20051018-2.pdf ("You see, we got people sneaking into our country to work. They
want to provide for their families. Family values do not stop at the Rio Grande River.
People are coming to put food on the table. But because there is no legal way for them to do
so, through a temporary worker program, they're putting pressure on our border. It makes
sense to have a rational plan that says, you can come and work on a temporary basis if an
employer can't find an American to do the job. It makes sense for the employer, it makes
sense for the worker, and it makes sense for those good people trying to enforce our border."
(statement of President George W. Bush)).
18. Consider the several manifestations of McCain/Kennedy comprehensive
immigration reform bills of which this Article only mentions a few, including, for example,
the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong.; the
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.; and the Secure
America and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005). See also
Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005, S. 1438, 109th Cong.;
Save America Comprehensive Immigration Act of 2005, H.R. 2092, 109th Cong. (sponsored
by Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee).
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worker proposal represented a rare instance of convergence among both
Democrats and Republicans. 19 Critics seemed unconvinced that "guests"
would actually remain "guests."
A vocal population of constituents
jammed congressional phone lines to express their opposition to the
program expansion. 20 The issue featured prominently in the presidential
campaign with one candidate, Mitt Romney, ominously warning that a new
guest worker program threatened to simply replicate the impossible
situation that the United States had faced before, namely, creating a
21
population of permanent temporary workers.
The evidence is on the side of the critics. One such "impossible"
situation was America's primary historical experience with guest worker
programs, a bilateral labor treaty known as the Mexican Bracero program. 22
In this program, screening was poor, visa-overstay rates were high, and
sanctioning was minimal. 23 During the program's two-decade tenure, there
was a significant spike in the apprehension of undocumented persons who
had been admitted as guest workers and had not complied with their visa
terms. 24 More than four decades since the demise of the Bracero program,
immigration reform debates demonstrate that concerns surrounding
screening and sanctioning persist.
Why is screening guest workers so difficult? The government is
generally better at screening than popular discourse would suggest. After
all, over one million aliens enter the United States daily, the overwhelming
majority of whom are temporary visitors who have been successfully

19. For both Republican and Democratic critiques of President George W. Bush's guest
worker proposal, see HR. 2092; Press Release, Governor Mitt Romney on Immigration
Reform (June 4, 2007), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20070607181345/www.
mittromney.com/News/Press-Releases/ImmigrationReformStatement.
20. Americans Against Illegal Immigration was among the opposition groups that
organized the congressional phone calling program. See Americans Against Illegal
Immigration, Stop the Illegals Now!, http://www.stoptheillegalsnow.com/help/callrep.php
(last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
21. Michelle Oddis, Immigration Reform: Makes Romney, Breaks MeCain, HUMAN
EVENTS.COM, May 25, 2007, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=20872.
22. The now-infamous Bracero ("farmhand") program was inaugurated under a bilateral
agreement with Mexico during World War II to meet critical agricultural labor shortages and
ultimately involved widespread visa overstays and deportations. See KrrY CALAVITA,
INSIDE THE STATE:
THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION AND THE I.N.S. (1992);
BARBARA A. DRISCOLL, THE TRACKS NORTH: THE RAILROAD BRACERO PROGRAM OF WORLD

WAR II, at 53-55 (1999); ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR (1964). There are a few

discussions of the Bracero program in the law review literature, which include Camille J.
Bosworth, Guest Worker Policy: A CriticalAnalysis of PresidentBush's ProposedReform,
56 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1100 (2005); Maria Elena Bickerton, Note, Prospectsfor a Bilateral
Immigration Agreement with Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, 79 TEX. L. REv.
895, 909 (2001); Merav Lichtenstein, Note, An Examination of Guest Worker Immigration
Reform Policiesin the United States, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 689 (2007).

23. For a general discussion of the program's failings, see Douglas S. Massey & Zai
Liang, The Long-Term Consequences of a Temporary Worker Program: The US Bracero
Experience, 8 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REv. 199 (1989).

24. Id. at 204; see also Martin & Teitelbaum, supra note 14.
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screened. 25 However, in the guest worker context, screening poses peculiar
challenges.
Applicants are generally the poorest citizens of poor
countries. 26 The applicants generally lack the traditional documentary
mechanisms to credibly establish that they are likely to be short-term
guests. 27 For example, they are less likely than high-skilled or high-income
applicants to be able to provide tangible evidence of traits that are
predictive of short-term tenure including source-country ties (such as assets
or professional ties in their home country). Moreover, these individuallevel constraints are augmented by nationwide resource and governance
constraints in poor countries, which undermine the applicants' efforts to
provide credible evidence of their inclination to play by the rules (such as
28
police reports).
Why is sanctioning such a challenge? Again in the guest worker context,
sanctioning raises peculiar challenges. 29 This difficulty arises from the
tenuous nature of the guest workers' ties to the state and the broader
society, which in turn arises from the parallel universe that they inhabit at
the margins of society. Moreover, even if aliens arrived legally in the first
place, as temporary visa recipients, their formal legal tenure in the United
States is necessarily brief. This reality only augments the tenuous nature of
their ties. 30 Guest workers rarely interact formally with state institutions,
even when they enter legally, and formal interaction with state institutions
is even less likely if they later overstay their visas and become
undocumented. 3 1 The fragility of these ongoing ties complicates the
deterrence issue because it is arguably more difficult to deploy formal
sanctions against such persons.
B. Heading in the Wrong Direction: CurrentAcademic Approaches to the
Problem
1.Screening
Although there has been renewed academic interest in guest worker
programs, the scholarship displays a disproportionate focus on "first order

25. Most of these persons are nonimmigrants, the overwhelming majority of whom enter
under the B 1-B2 category, which is referred to in shorthand as the visitor visa for business or
pleasure. IRA J.KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 413-18 (8th ed.
2002).
26. The World Bank annual report details the relevant characteristics of this population
that pose difficulties in screening. See WORLD BANK, supra note 7, at 57-58.

27. Id. at 59-60.
28. Id. at 73.
29. There are differing views about the difficulty of deploying sanctions against
undocumented workers. For a summary of the differing views, see Tamar Jacoby,
ImmigrationNation, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 50 (2006); see also Massey & Liang, supra note 23.
30. Jacoby, supra note 29.
31. Id.
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issues," 32 that is, on what the ultimate goals of guest worker programs
should be in light of the underlying moral commitments of a liberal
constitutional democracy. 33 The scholarship has an expansionist flavor
with a focus on the admission of more aliens, for longer periods, and with a
broader cadre of rights, and thus displays a clear detachment from
restrictionist political realities. This is not atypical. The underlying current
of most immigration law scholarship is expansionist. 34 Like the broader
immigration law review literature, scholarship on guest workers leaves
crucial questions of institutional design unexamined.
The work of Adam Cox and Eric Posner is a prominent exception to this
They emphasize second-order institutional design
scholarly trend.
questions, namely, how to best screen for those aliens who satisfy stipulated
first-order goals regarding number, type, and tenure. 35 These scholars
characterize immigration screening primarily as an informational
problem, 36 in that a state must meet the challenge of obtaining enough
information to ascertain whether a potential entrant matches its type
preferences. The principal design choice for any state is between ex ante
screening, in which an alien is screened on the basis of pre-entry
information and denied entry if she does not fit the state's first-order goals,
and an ex post system, in which an alien is screened on the basis of
postentry information and deported if she does not meet first-order policy

32. See Motomura, supra note 4. The term "first order" is Adam Cox and Eric Posner's.
See Cox & Posner, supra note 4, at 811.
33. See, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 955; Karla M.
Campbell, Guest Worker Programs and the Convergence of U.S. Immigration and
Development Policies: A Two-Factor Economic Model, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 663 (2007);
Immigration Restrictions as
Howard F. Chang, Immigration and the Workplace:
Employment Discrimination,78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 291 (2003); Bradly J. Condon & J. Brad
McBride, Do You Know the Way to San Jos ? Resolving the Problem of Illegal Mexican
Migration to the United States, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 251 (2003); Andrew J. Elmore,
Egalitarianism and Exclusion: U.S. Guest Worker Programs and a Non-subordination
Approach to the Labor-Based Admission of Nonprofessional Foreign Nationals, 21 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 521 (2007); Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World:
Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 737 (2003); Philip Martin, Guest Workers: New Solution or New Problem?, 2007
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289; Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The
Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345
(2001); Belinda I. Reyes, The Impact of U.S. Immigration Policy on Mexican Unauthorized
Immigration, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 131; Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for
Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497 (2004).
34. Peter Schuck has made this point. See Schuck, supra note 4.
35. See Cox & Posner, supra note 4.
36. Cox and Posner's primary focus is on mechanisms of screening immigrants (that is,
persons who are admitted for long-term residence and possibly citizenship). However, they
point out that their analytical framework is also applicable to the challenges of admitting
temporary guests. Id. at 813-14; see also Michael J. Trebilcock, Immigration Policy, in
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 259 (Peter Newman ed., 1998);
Michael J. Trebilcock, The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy, 5 AM. LAW & ECON.
REV. 271 (2003).
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goals. 37 While most developed economies at least purport to rely on ex
ante screening to match aliens to the low-skilled service subsectors of their
labor markets, Cox and Posner note in the American context, this goal is
illusory. Rather, the low-skilled sector of the U.S. labor market is currently
serviced by a shadow system of illegal immigration. 38 Cox and Posner
ex post
conceptualize the illegal immigration system "as a de facto
39
screening system operated under the guise of an ex ante system."
They support this claim by shifting their focus from the formal legal
framework to the actual enforcement decisions.4 0 The formal legal
framework provides that persons are deportable simply on the basis of
illegal entry. However, as a practical matter, rather than pursuing all
undocumented entrants (as they are required to do in theory on the basis of
the ex ante rule), officials have historically only pursued those who commit
other (i.e., nonimmigration) crimes. Thus, in reality, the system as it relates
to low-skilled workers is an ex post system in which entrants, who later
provide evidence of undesirability, are screened only after their entry, and
the criminal justice system,
then deported. In their words, "[c]ontact with
41
then, becomes the de facto proxy for type."
Cox and Posner argue that the emphasis on ex post screening is not
coincidental. Rather, they argue that this system is in fact a reflection of a
clear institutional preference for an ex post system to an ex ante system in
the context of low-skilled aliens. 42 A primary rationale for this preference
is that, for the low-skilled subsector of the labor market, ex post indicators
43
typically provide more accurate information than ex ante indicators.
Specifically, juxtaposing the selection of low-skilled workers with highskilled aliens in Canada and other developed economies (where aliens earn
visa points which are indexed to their qualifications), they argue that for
low-skilled workers, ex ante indicators are typically unreliable predictors of
44
desirability.
However, this institutional bias for ex post screening does not comport
with the expressed preferences of actors in both the legislative and
executive branches. For several decades, a coalition of shifting political
alliances has sought to ensure that the admission of large numbers of lowskilled persons has been premised on temporary tenure. 4 5 In a post-9/1 1
world, the modem manifestation of this sentiment is not only an insistence
on temporary tenure, but a simultaneous insistence that they are screened

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See Cox & Posner, supra note 4, at 812.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 845.
Id.
Id. at 846.
Id. at 847.

43. Id.

44. Id.
45. ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG,

A NATION BY DESIGN:

FASHIONING OF AMERICA 436 (2006).
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prior to arrival. 46 Although Cox and Posner do not contend that reliable ex
ante screening for short-term type is futile, an assumption regarding the
inherent difficulty of ex ante screening underlies their work, and imposes
significant constraints on available policy modifications to temporary
worker programs. Another difficulty with the Cox and Posner framework is
its American-centric focus in a globalized world, namely, its failure to take
account of those actors outside the United States that can help in ex ante
information gathering.
2. Difficulties in Sanctioning and Deterrence
Why do some persons comply with immigration laws? Unlike the
criminal law, where there is a plethora of writing on compliance and
deterrence, 47 the legal scholarship is largely silent on these points in the
context of immigration law. 4 8 While Cox and Posner briefly discuss the
importance of finding appropriately calibrated ex post sanctions (which
deter entry from undesirable types but not from desirable types), they do not
discuss what such sanctions might look like. 49 Moreover, although scholars
have bemoaned the historical ineffectiveness of the state, and the increasing
proposals to sanction, 50 they have not addressed the peculiar challenges that
51
accompany sanctioning in the temporary worker context.
Low-skilled aliens are often not visible to the broader population, and as
such, are often "out of sight." The difficulty of sanctioning is exacerbated
by the disinclination of many Americans to cooperate with the authorities,
given their deep ambivalence about sanctioning persons who may lack
formal permission to work, but who are otherwise law-abiding and making
46. Id.
47. For a good summary of the deterrence literature in the criminal law context, see
Kahan, supra note 13.
48. There have been occasional allusions in the literature to this issue. For example,
Peter Schuck wrote over a decade ago reflecting on the centrality of the deterrence question:
The essential idea of a prevention strategy is quite simple and compelling. To
the extent that aliens who are likely to be illegal at entry or to lose their legal status
after entry can be deterred from attempting to come to the United States, or
detected and prevented from entering the United States once they arrive, the
necessity for detention-indeed, for any further enforcement activity-will be
minimized.
Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A "White Paper," 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667,
678 (1997).
49. See Cox & Posner, supra note 4, at 847-48.
50. For a discussion of the increasing popularity of punitive measures in the name of
deterrence, see DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (2007); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002); Legomsky, supra
note 11.
51. This has been recognized by a range of scholars from other diverse academic
disciplines who advocate policy prescriptions that fall at differing points along the political
spectrum. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J. MALONE, BEYOND
SMOKE AND MIRRORS:

MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

(2002); Jacoby, supra note 29; Martin, supra note 7; Martin & Teitelbaum, supra note 14;
Demitrios G. Papademetriou, Philip L. Martin & Mark J. Miller, U.S. Immigration Policy:
The Guestworker Option Revisited, 21 INT'L MIGRATION 39 (1983).
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critical contributions to the economy. 52 Clearly, the transitory nature of this
population is relevant in institutional design. As was the case in screening,
the challenges become more imposing if they are viewed through an
American-centric lens.
In the current political context, there is likely to be profound skepticism
about drawing on the help of actors outside the United States to help
perform a function, such as sanctioning, that is seen as central to the federal
government's immigration power. Outsourcing proposals are now referred
to pejoratively as the "Halliburton approach," and are likely to be viewed
particularly skeptically in the immigration context. 5 3 However, the United
States regularly incentivizes third-party entities within its borders not only
to screen for aliens who violate immigration laws, but also to aid in the
process of sanctioning by reporting them. This is precisely the function of
employer-sanction statutes that penalize employers who fail to screen aliens
for work permits and report noncompliant persons. 54 Moreover, even
outside the United States, third-party entities have historically aided
screening and reporting. 55 For example, carrier sanction statutes penalize
carriers who fail to screen aliens before they board vessels to the56 United
States, or fail to report those who utilize fraudulent documentation.
Unlike the criminal law review literature, 57 which recognizes the
implications for institutional design of ethnographic research (both in
populations that sanction and populations that are being sanctioned), the
immigration law literature has not typically utilized such research. Arising
partly from such research, there has emerged in the criminal law literature a
more full-bodied account of deterrence arising from a broadened
understanding of "what the law is." 5 8 In contrast, debates about sanctioning
and deterrence in the context of immigration have as their point of departure
a very formalistic understanding of law, one that privileges formal legal
regimes and does not account for the effect of norms on law abidance. A
52. MASSEY ET AL., supra note 51.

53. CNN commentator Lou Dobbs is perhaps the best-known proponent of such views.
For commentary on Lou Dobbs's approach, which is comedic but nevertheless elucidates the
skepticism toward such proposals, see Andy Borowitz, Illegal Immigrants to Write
Immigration Bill, HUFFINGTON POST, June 13, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andyborowitz/congress-hires-illegal-im b 51903.html.
54. See The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006) (codifying

employer sanctions); Bosniak, supra note 33 (discussing the history of employer sanctions).
55. ZOLBERG, supra note 45.

56. For a general discussion of carrier sanctions, see Erika Feller, CarrierSanctions and
InternationalLaw, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 48, 55-63 (1989).
57. See, e.g., Meares, supra note 13.

58. It is not my intention to engage the long-standing debate arising out of the law and
society movement about what law "is," but simply to make the point that it has long been

recognized in the criminal law context that social norms have a significant impact on how
persons debate criminal law. For a summary of work about what constitutes "law" from a
law and society perspective, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-essentialist Version of Legal

Pluralism,27 J. L. & Soc'v 296 (2000). For a widely cited example of norms enthusiasm in
the criminal context, see Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence,
83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997).
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robust literature has developed on norms-based sanctioning and deterrence
in the criminal law. 59 The immigration law review literature has no such
equivalent.
II. A NEW APPROACH: PARTIALLY OUTSOURCED PRESCREENING AND
PARTIALLY OUTSOURCED NORMS-BASED SANCTIONING

A. First-OrderAssumptions
The discussion that follows is based on several admittedly contested and
controversial assumptions surrounding "first-order" issues. In his historical
examination of immigration policy, Aristide Zolberg demonstrates that
immigration policy has always been characterized by an ongoing political
consensus (supported by shifting alliances in different historical periods)
that economic growth is inextricably tied to an ongoing flow of
in those historical periods where new entrants were
newcomers. 60 Even
"not welcome," 6 1 an ongoing coalition of business interests ensured that
62
they were nevertheless "wanted" as temporary entrants.
The practical manifestation of this "pragmatic restrictionism" is that a
consensus has developed among the legislative and executive branches that
63
an ongoing inflow of low-skilled entrants to fill service jobs is necessary.
However, given the historical and ongoing ambivalence about admitting
low-skilled aliens on a long-term basis, any politically practicable course of
action is likely to be premised on short-term tenure. Any policy proposal is
also likely to be accompanied by more stringent mechanisms of ensuring
64
that persons who enter temporarily are in fact held to these terms.
59. Building on Jeremy Bentham's classic conception of deterrence, the recognition of
the impact of norms on deterrence (normative deterrence) is a recognized concept in the
criminal law; it does not appear to have been applied to immigration law. Examples of such
work include Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663 (1999); Dan
M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996)
[hereinafter Alternative Sanctions]. For a critique of proposals arising from a norms-based
approach to deterrence, see Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critiqueof the
Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, The Broken Windows Theory, and OrderMaintenancePolicing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998). For other discussions
which recognize the importance of norms in discussions of deterrence, see Paul H. Robinson
& John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 471-88 (1997) (contending
that the classical utilitarian conception of deterrence fails to appreciate the importance of
norms in governing the willingness of citizens to obey the law); see also Alvin K. Klevorick,
On the Economic Theory of Crime, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, NOMOS XXVII, at 289, 292-94,

301-04 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (maintaining that the economic
theory of deterrence fails to account for the role of societal norms).
60. See generallyZOLBERG, supra note 45, at 432-59.
61. Id. at 436.
62. Id.
63. See Jacoby, supra note 29, at 50 ("In fact, the nation is far less divided on
immigration.., than the current debate suggests.").
64. Id. ("Some legislators.., insist that any new slots be strictly temporary: workers
would be admitted, perhaps without family, for a period of two or three or six years and
").
would then go home ....
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Notably, the proposals that attracted the most support in the last Congress
were all predicated on the temporary tenure of low-skilled aliens, combined
65
with mechanisms of tracking compliance.
This political consensus has clear implications for the first-order issue of
"type." In the same way that INA displays clear preferences for certain
"types" among the highly skilled (e.g., computer scientists) with
accompanying mechanisms of validating type (e.g., professional
qualifications), 66 immigration policy will increasingly focus on meeting an
articulated political consensus for short-term "types" among the lowskilled, with accompanying mechanisms of validating type. This first-order
goal dictates certain second-order design priorities. There will be a
renewed institutional focus on finding reliable predictors of likelihood of

temporary tenure and screening applicants according to these predictive

criteria, 6 7 as well as a renewed focus on devising mechanisms of effectively
sanctioning those who are ultimately not short-term "types. ' 68 The
discussion that follows is essentially a refinement of these "second-order"
institutional design questions.
B. The Partial-Outsourcing
Normative Deterrence Proposal

This section's partial-outsourcing normative deterrence proposal consists
of five principal prongs. Given that a primary goal of immigration law is to
collect information about the desirability of potential entrants, the first
prong contends that the United States should execute flexible bilateral

arrangements with source-labor countries to partially outsource the ex ante
screening function. 69

The source-labor country would then leverage its

65. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong.;
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.; Secure America
and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005); Save America Comprehensive
Immigration Act of 2005, H.R. 2092, 109th Cong.
66. For a general discussion of the clear preference for certain types of talent, see Ayelet
Shachar, The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration
Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 148 (2006). For example, in many developed economies there
is a clear preference for migrants with particular technical skills (e.g., computer scientists)
who can contribute to the high-growth technical sectors of the economy.
67. See, e.g., Cox & Posner, supra note 4, at 824 ("A central second-order design
question is how to sort applicants for immigration, so that only the desired types are
admitted, where the desired type is just the type of person who satisfies the criteria derived
from a state's first-order immigration goals.").
68. See Jacoby, supra note 29, at 50-51 ("[V]irtually every major media outlet has
surveyed public attitudes on the issue, and the results have been remarkably consistent ....
[A]n overwhelming majority.., would like to see Congress address the problem with ...
tougher enforcement ....
").
69. Transparency concerns are also significant in light of the partial outsourcing
proposal, particularly given extensive evidence that corruption was rife in previous iterations
of such programs, such as the Bracero program, and also that there was systematic exclusion
of particular groups of persons who were disenfranchised within their own societies. See
generally CALAVITA, supra note 22; DRISCOLL, supra note 22; GALARZA, supra note 22.

This subject is a fertile area for further research, but to remain true to its own liberal
egalitarian principles and to mitigate such concerns, it seems clear that, at a minimum, the
United States should only enter into bilateral labor agreements with liberal egalitarian
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of screening for those who
proximity to its nationals, to aid in the process
70
are likely to be compliant with their visas.
This proposal does not advocate the wholesale outsourcing of the
screening function. Rather, under this partial outsourcing proposal, the
United States would set the screening rules, while incentivizing the sourcelabor country to administer them. 7 1 The aim is to provide appropriate
oversight, but allow sufficient flexibility for the source-labor country to
Although the academic literature widely acknowledges that democratic
democracies.
mechanisms of accountability are at best imperfect, democratic mechanisms are helpful in
holding both political and administrative actors accountable for transparent noncorrupt
administration. For a discussion of the imperfections of liberal democracies in monitoring
the actions of politicians and administrators, see MATTHEW R. CLEARY & SUSAN C. STOKES,
DEMOCRACY AND THE CULTURE OF SKEPTICISM: POLITICAL TRUST IN ARGENTINA AND
MEXICO (2006); R. Douglas Arnold, Can Inattentive Citizens Control Their Elected
Representatives?, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer
eds., 1993). This is particularly the case if the contracting country has a vibrant civil society
with a network of interest groups, which function alongside a free press to monitor
politicians and administrators. This has certainly been the case in Jamaica, where political
actors are disinclined to interfere with the program given its overwhelming popularity with
the electorate.
70. This Article focuses on the community for generating norm entrepreneurs and
enforcers. Yet simultaneously it focuses on the nation for screening and compliance. This
leads to an obvious question: is the nation the best unit for generating the norms that are
necessary to a model of normative deterrence? It bears emphasizing that in all of the
analytical models that I utilize in this work (including Richard McAdams and Eric Posner's),
the state is assumed to be the most effective agent of norm generation, primarily because it is
able to promulgate and enforce rules. However, the state and the nation are not necessarily
synonymous, and I acknowledge that the small size of Jamaica (and the corresponding
proximity of the state to the communities in which these norms are being promulgated) may
have influenced the ability of the state in this particular context to influence norms.
Nevertheless, it appears that the Jamaican situation is a "hard case" for a variety of
reasons including high levels of crime, visa noncompliance and deportation from the United
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. It is notable that, even in this hard case, the model
still appears to work. This might speak to the model's generalizable nature with respect to
other less difficult contexts (i.e., with lower visa-noncompliance rates). However, there may
be differences in the applicability of this model to different societies depending on a variety
of factors, including proximity to the United States, the credibility and effectiveness of the
state as an actor in the communities from which guest workers originate, the extent to which
communities are closely knit, the pervasiveness of reputational effects, and so on. One could
also imagine instances in which the nation might not be the best unit of either screening or
enforcement. This leads to the intuition that the model might be modified to suit particular
society-specific contexts (depending on the proximity of the source-labor nation-state to the
communities from which guest workers originate).
71. I do not address the issue of how the costs associated with administering this model
should be shared between guest workers, employers, the source-labor country, and the
United States. This is a potentially rich area for later research, but a reasonable initial
response would be to note that there generally will be significant differentials in the
capability of the source-labor nations and the United States to bear the costs, and that the
principles of distributive justice (embodied in the work of a range of liberal theorists
including Bruce Ackerman, Michael Walzer, and John Rawls) should apply. BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971); WALZER, supra note 3. It seems reasonable to argue that the labor-importing
countries, which are undoubtedly richer as measured by a variety of indices (and who
arguably benefit disproportionately from labor importation) should bear the more significant
proportion of the costs associated with the administration of such programs.
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adapt the screening rules to its own conditions on the ground, with the
United States intervening only when source-labor innovations appear to be
inappropriate. 72 Simultaneously, to improve the deterrence function, the
second prong contends that the United States should enlist the support of
the source-labor country in imposing sanctions.
One mechanism of augmenting the likelihood of appropriate screening
and sanctioning is the utilization of collective sanctioning systems. These
have historically been employed effectively to improve compliance in a
variety of informal arenas in which formal legal structures were either not
present or insufficient, and in modem times "as a regulatory strategy of
delegating deterrence." 73 The third prong argues that the United States
should structure the bilateral arrangements so as to penalize the sourcelabor country by reducing available visas if the overstay rates of its
nationals become too high. 74 In turn, the source-labor country would likely
72. In this regard, there are similarities to Ian Ayres and John Braithwaites's concept of
regulatory pyramids of enforcement. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
73. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 349 (2003). Daryl
Levinson provides a brief overview of the utilization of collective sanctions both historically
and in modem times, with an emphasis on functional rationales for collective sanctioning,
emphasizing that central features of modem legal systems, including vicarious, joint and
several, and corporate liability, are justified utilizing similar functional rationales. For a
further discussion in the law review literature of the moral and functional justifications for
collective sanctions, see also Saul Levmore, Rethinking Group Responsibility and Strategic
Threats in Biblical Texts and Modern Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 85, 89-90 (1995).
Beyond the law review literature, the economics literature also has an extensive
discussion of functional rationales for collective sanctioning. For example, economic
historians credit collective sanctioning for facilitating a commercial revolution in late
medieval times by allowing long-distance commercial exchange between parties who had no
prior knowledge of each other. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic
Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525
(1993); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the
Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989). In the Jamaican context, collective
sanctioning appears to work well when applied to microlending. For a broader discussion of
the importance of collective sanctioning to microfinance (in the form of joint liability
lending), see Maitreesh Ghatak, Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability
Lending and the PeerSelection Effect, 110 ECON. J. 601, 602 (2000).
74. One could argue that the country and the community are standing behind the guest
worker as guarantors in a very loose utilization of the term. There are analogies to the
economic rationales for using guarantees, with the community playing an analogous role.
See Avery Weiner Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract,66 U. CHI. L. REv.
47 (1999). The utilization of the term "guaranty" is controversial; indeed, this proposal may
call to mind Soviet-era "guest worker" programs in which threats against communities were
used to secure the return of guest workers. See. e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Credible
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519-40
(1983). It bears emphasizing that the program discussed herein recommends the "soft"
utilization of group accountability, and, as such, the proposal would not countenance any
such abuses. In any event, the issue of ensuring individual human rights protections in
programs such as these is a fertile area for future work. As a preliminary matter, this Article
recommends that the United States enter into outsourcing programs only with liberal
egalitarian democracies, partly in an effort to guard against such abuses.
It bears emphasizing that there is an evolving international norm against collective
punishment. See Levinson, supra note 73. The question becomes: does it matter whether
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discount the probability that members of any given community will become
guest workers if their fellow community members abscond. This would
create incentives for community members to alert the authorities if they are
in danger of selecting a neighbor who is not a short-term type. Community
members would also be incentivized to monitor the compliance decisions of
their neighbors since their own prospects of future work as guest workers
would be compromised if their neighbors abscond.
In a practical micro application of this macro principle, the model's
fourth prong advocates that the source-labor country should designate
intermediaries in communities from which guest workers originate to both
screen and sanction. 75
Typically, these intermediaries should be
community leaders who are trusted both by the authorities and their
communities. In instances when an applicant's type is not readily apparent
to the authorities, these intermediaries would share inside information,
which helps with type prediction. When persons abscond, future references
from these intermediaries should be discounted. In so doing, the authorities
would be sanctioning intermediaries and indirectly sanctioning the
communities that depend on them for access to the program. Collective
sanctioning would still apply, but in a "thin" rather than "thick" version.
The central role of the community in improving compliance is not
coincidental. The fifth prong argues that communal norms may exercise
more influence on visa-compliance decisions than the formal legal
framework. 76
If visa-compliance decisions are norms-based, these
the sanction recommended really involves the selection of a country for the privilege of
involvement in a guest worker program, rather than exclusion of a country from generally
available migration privileges? I would argue that the key difference is that a collective
reward is being withheld (as opposed to a collective punishment being imposed), although
the literature uses the term sanctioning more broadly to reference both group punishments
and rewards. See, e.g., id. at 376. Nevertheless, the utilization of group accountability
principles raises significant justice concerns, which present a fertile area for later work. In
the philosophy literature, there is a general view that collective sanctioning conflicts with the
liberal obligation to prioritize individuals as moral agents. See generally, e.g., COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS (Larry May & Stacey

Hoffman eds., 1991); PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
(1984); GROUPS AND GROUP RIGHTS (Christine Sistare, Larry May & Leslie Francis eds.,
2001); LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS:

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-

BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS (1987); Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J.
PHIL. 674 (1968).

75. The term intermediary is influenced by the utilization of the term "intermediary in
trust" in the sociology literature. See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
THEORY 197-240 (1990).

76. This model is influenced by the norms literature in its recognition that subjects feel
obligated to follow certain rules, irrespective of formal legal arrangements, because of an
internalized moral commitment or fear of informal sanctions. Surprisingly, immigration law
appears largely untouched by the norms scholarship. It is an account of legal influence (as
opposed to legal centralism). Although the economics literature appears to be most
influential in modem discussions of "norms" scholarship, the discussion of "norms" has a
distinguished heritage that predates this contribution with interdisciplinary contributions
from the fields of anthropology and sociology. For a summary of anthropological and
sociological work in this area, see SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS:
AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH (1978); Richard Abel, What We Talk About When We Talk
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As
intermediaries in trust may fulfill another important function.
community leaders, they are also typically norm influencers who are wellplaced to both identify and recommend only those who subscribe to norms
that prioritize visa compliance and to stigmatize and sanction those who do
not.
Another potential benefit of a partial-outsourcing approach is that the
United States could enlist the support of the source-labor country in
imposing sanctions on overstaying workers. Notably, these sanctions could
operate not only (directly) against visa violators who are found and
deported to the source-labor country, but also (indirectly) against violators
who are underground in the United States. More specifically, informal
sanctions may be activated against a particular worker if the United States
knows that the worker has overstayed and is unable to locate him, because
the worker's ongoing voluntary contacts with the intermediary who
originally recommended him and his entire community of origin would give
members an opportunity to express disapproval.
There is yet a further subtle point to be made. In this model, the power to
sanction is derivative of the power to screen. Even if the source-labor
government had no legal authority to sanction persons for visa infractions
on American soil, it would nevertheless be able to wield credibly the threat
of sanction not only against visa violators but also against its
communities-through its power to deny visa violators future access to
guest worker visas and the power to discount recommendations from
77
community leaders, thereby indirectly penalizing the community.
The recognition of the impact of norms on deterrence is a recognized
concept in other areas of the law; it appears not to have been applied to
immigration law. In emphasizing informal sanctions, this proposal is
unusual in the current environment in which sanctioning is synonymous in
the popular discourse with a range of punitive proposals including increased
detentions. 7 8 While such punitive proposals may fulfill an "expressive"
function, 79 they are not in keeping with the "progressive credentials" of the
original Benthamite conceptions of deterrence, 80 which in "the most

About Law, in THE LAW AND SOCIETY READER 1, 1-10 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1995); Sally
Falk Moore, General Introduction, in LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER 1, 2 (Sally Falk
Moore ed., 2005) [hereinafter Moore, LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY]. The landmark text in the
law and economics literature is ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
77. Notably, sanctioning and screening are separate and analytically distinct functions
that should be distinguished and need not necessarily be coupled. Moreover, there are other
potential sanctions that could be added to the model that are not derivative of the power to
screen.

78. See Legomsky, supra note 11 (providing examples of these punitive trends); see also
Jacoby, supra note 29; Martin & Teitelbaum, supra note 14.
79. See Kahan, supra note 59 (articulating the importance of the "expressive" function
of punishment).
80. Bentham's classic definition of deterrence compared the utility of benefits to the
disutility of losses. As long as losses exceed benefits, or pain exceeds pleasure, then the
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theoretically elegant applications ... have always involved showing how
less can be more." 8 1 In the spirit of showing how less can be more, this
model posits an unconventional, norms-based approach to augmenting
deterrence.
C. Evidence that This Approach Will Work
This section lays out a statistical background for the larger argument by
examining the differences in visa-compliance rates for similar populations
of Jamaican guest workers in Canada and the United States. This section
then turns to a microlevel qualitative study of a sample of administrators
and guest workers to discern the rationales that underlie their visacompliance decision making. It begins with a brief note on methodology.
1. Methodology
The decision to focus on the Jamaica-Canada program was driven by a
number of data points. 82 After Mexico, Jamaica supplies the largest
absolute numbers of documented guest workers to both the United States
and Canada, and by some preliminary estimates, low-skilled Jamaicans fall
within the top five nationalities on a per capita basis in the undocumented
population in the United States. 83 Indeed, the metaphorical Jamaican on
Saturday Night Live working nine jobs (in clear violation of immigration
laws) signifies the extent to which Jamaican and "undocumented worker"
actor is deterred from undertaking the activity. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1823) (1789).

81. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 645 (2000).
82. There are few academic studies of Jamaican guest workers in Canada. The
exceptions are R. G. Cecil & G. E. Ebanks, The Caribbean Migrant Farm Worker
Programme in Ontario: Seasonal Expansion of West Indian Economic Spaces, 30 INT'L
MIGRATION 19 (1992); R. G. Cecil & G. E. Ebanks, The Human Condition of West Indian
MigrantFarm Labour in Southwestern Ontario, 29 INT'L MIGRATION 389 (1991).

83. Jamaicans are believed to have the highest representation on a per capita basis in the
undocumented population in Canada. This information was garnered from an interview with
the Chief Technical Officer in the Ministry of National Security in Jamaica. For a broader
discussion of high levels of noncompliance by Jamaicans with immigration laws in the
United States, see Zagros Madjd-Sadjadi & Dillon Alleyne, The PotentialJamaican Impact
of Criminal Deportees from the United States, 5 J. ETHNICITY & CRIM. JUST. 29 (2007).

Utilizing statistical modeling, the authors provide indicative statistics on the number of
Jamaicans in the undocumented population. The preliminary estimates regarding the
representation of Jamaicans among the low-skilled documented and undocumented
population in both Canada and the United States arise from conversations with researchers in
the Remittance Research Project in the Department of Economics at the Jamaica Mona
Campus of the University of the West Indies. See also Milton Vickerman, Jamaica, in THE
NEW AMERICANS: A GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION SINCE 1965, at 479 (Mary C. Waters & Reed

Ueda eds., 2007). Milton Vickerman notes that the Jamaicans consistently express a high
desire to migrate and that the emigration rate is propelled "by an entrenched tradition of
migration and economic hardship." Id. Taking into account the population size, the
emigration rate is very high, with migrant Jamaicans constituting a third of Jamaica's
population. Id. In 2001, Jamaicans were the second-most-likely population on a per capita
basis to migrate to the United States. Id.
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are intertwined in the popular imagination. Moreover, the visa-compliance

rates among Jamaican guest workers in Canada are high, even against a
more mixed record of visa compliance among Jamaican guest workers in

the United States. Additionally, there are clear analogies between labor
markets in the United States and Canada. Canada has critical labor
shortages in comparable economic sectors and has historically relied on

aliens from the same proximate markets in Latin America 85and the
Caribbean to fill these shortages, 84 albeit in more limited numbers.
Given the high visa-compliance rates among Jamaican guest workers in
Canada, the principal objective of the study was to explore the rationales
that they offer for their visa-compliance decisions. The author conducted
the field work. 86 The research design was primarily qualitative and the
study methodology was multimethod in focus. This is a difficult to reach
population and, partly for this reason, the study was not randomized.

Rather, utilizing referrals from guest workers and program administrators,
the author developed a snowball sample, a method that is often used in
subject was an
studies of subjects with similar characteristics. 87 The typical
88

agricultural worker from a rural Jamaican community.

Research
The approach was both "top down" and "bottom up."
participants included Jamaican guest workers, legal officers in Jamaica and
84. For a comparative discussion of American and Canadian historical approaches to
RETHINKING
immigration generally, see WILL KYMLICKA, FINDING OUR WAY:
ETHNOCULTURAL RELATIONS IN CANADA (1998).
85. See generally MARTIN COLLACOTT, CANADA'S IMMIGRATION POLICY: THE NEED FOR
MAJOR REFORM (2002).
86. 1 acknowledge the work of Mr. Densil Reid, who has significant experience in
fieldwork in rural populations. He conducted thirteen of the guest work interviews and
participated in twenty-two others.
87. Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein, whose work has been utilized in the law review
scholarship on entitlement programs, employed a similar methodology in their landmark
study of a difficult to reach population, namely, single mothers on welfare. See Matthew
Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion and Entrepreneurial
Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1171-72 (2000) (citing KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA
LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LoW-WAGE
The methodology of this study was influenced by grounded theory
WORK (1997)).
approaches to qualitative research. See ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: GROUNDED THEORY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES (1990).
88. Although tourism workers and certain tradespersons in construction are now eligible
to access the Canadian labor market under more recently developed Canadian visa programs,
in the Jamaican context, these persons are not understood to be low-skilled since they have
received some formal training in trade schools and completed tests to gain certifications. As
such, I restricted the sample to persons who are understood in the Jamaican context to be
"low-skilled," namely, agricultural workers. Their access to overseas labor markets is most
restricted, since they are considered high risks for immigration infractions. They typically
lack formal training, are low-income, and are poorly situated to provide the collateral that is
required to demonstrate their suitability for visas.
Across a broad range of temporary visa categories, Canadian consulates have the
discretion to require aliens to provide evidence of their educational levels, of real property
ownership, or ownership of other items of value. These are taken as evidence of financial or
professional ties to the country of origin. Low-skilled Jamaicans do not have such "capital,"
and have typically not had legal access to Canada outside of family sponsorship programs.
As such, participants in the Jamaica-Canada program are trendsetters.
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Canada who negotiate the bilateral agreements, administrators in both
jurisdictions who promulgate rules, admissions officers who conduct
screening, industry representatives who are integrally involved in the
program's administration, and Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) and
union representatives who advocate on behalf of migrant farm workers.
The research was designed to draw on a range of different regions from
which guest workers originate, including the sugar-cane-producing areas,
the banana-producing areas and the vegetable-producing areas. Interviews
constituted the principal research method and detailed interviews are on file
with the author. In total, interviews were conducted with eighty-one
informants, including fifty guest workers. 89
2. Brief Background Framework to the Jamaica-Canada Program
The Jamaican Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program9" is governed by
bilateral administrative arrangements that are formalized in a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) 9 ! between Canada and Jamaica; under the MOU,
the Jamaican government formally assumes partial responsibility for
screening potential candidates and informally assumes responsibility for
tracking visa violators and reporting them to Canada. Under the terms of
the MOU, the number of visas offered, and the criteria and terms attending
admission, are entirely within the discretion of Canada.
From time to time, the MOU is updated by bilateral administrative
agreements. Government representatives meet to negotiate critical aspects
89. Notably, in addition to the small sample size, a limitation of the study is that I was
unable to locate any persons who have not complied with the visa terms, since these persons
have presumably disappeared into the underground economy in violation of Canadian laws
and interview subjects were either unwilling or unable to provide access to them. An online
counterpart to this Article contains more detailed statistical analyses. I hold detailed
transcripts of all the interviews with guest workers on file.
90. The Jamaican Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program operates within a tripartite
institutional framework. At the federal level, the program is implemented within the
framework of the Immigration Refugee and Protection Act and Regulations, which is
premised on the "Canadians First" principle. See Commentary to the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, intro., at 13, reprinted in LORNE WALDMAN, CANADIAN
IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE LAW PRACTICE 13 (2004). At the provincial level, the program is
governed by employment, labor, and health regulations. The program also operates within
bilateral administrative arrangements between Canada and Jamaica. Employment contracts
between Canadian employers and migrant workers are also important; they are subject to
review by both Canada and Jamaica. See VEENA VERMA, N. S. INST., THE MEXICAN AND
CARIBBEAN SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS PROGRAM (2003).
91. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Canada and the
Government of Jamaica Concerning the Commonwealth Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Program, Dec. 5, 1994 [hereinafter Can.-Jam. MOU] (on file with author); see also
Irving Andre, The Genesis and Persistence of the Commonwealth Caribbean Seasonal
Agricultural Workers Program in Canada, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243 (1990). The
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) continues in force unless terminated by either party
giving three months notice in writing to the other party. If such notice has not been
provided, the MOU remains in force. The MOU is typically updated by administrative
agreements. The most recent administrative agreement is the 2008 Agreement for the
Employment in Canada of Commonwealth Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers.
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of the program, such as visa numbers, eligibility requirements, and wage
levels. The MOU is executed by a cabinet-level official in each signatory
country and administered by two government agencies in Canada, namely,
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and Human Resources and
Skills Development Canada (HRSD), and the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security (MOL or Ministry of Labour) in Jamaica. It has been the historical
practice of both Canada and Jamaica to include other stakeholders as
observers to these negotiations to ensure that the program has the "buy-in"
of parties with diverse interests. These include employers' groups, farm
worker representatives, and Jamaican and Canadian NGOs.
The benefits and compromises for each of the program's stakeholders are
evident in the manner that the program is made operational. To incentivize
employers to participate, the Canadian government subsidizes their
recruiting costs. Canada extends diplomatic status to a team of Jamaican
social workers ("liaison officers") who monitor the welfare of the workers
within Canada. In this way, Canada mitigates the concerns of farm worker
representatives and NGOs about health and labor infractions. Moreover, it
supplements its own regulatory framework through an additional informal
level of oversight since employers agree to site visits by Jamaican liaison
officers (who are in turn obligated to report infractions to the Canadian
authorities). Finally, to mitigate concerns about the long-term deployment
of farm-workers in "dead-end" jobs with no potential for skills
improvement, the Canadian government has offered targeted development
assistance to farm workers to upgrade their agricultural training. Notably,
these human capital improvements benefit both Canadian farms and family
farms in communities of origin.
The ongoing "buy-in" of diverse stakeholders has benefits that extend
beyond operational success. Parties interviewed emphasized that the
ongoing expansion of the program over four decades and its perceived
immunity to political attack even in the face of a rising anti-immigration
sentiment within Canada clearly reflected the fact that the stakeholders,
who represented a broad range of interests on the Canadian political
spectrum, were satisfied with its results and invested in its continuing
success.
The criteria for selection appear to be minimal. Under the MOU, the
MOL, which has administrative responsibility for candidate selection, is
asked to recommend healthy, able-bodied persons with no criminal record
and farming experience. Although the Jamaican government may not
modify the Canadian criteria, they are encouraged to augment these
criteria-which are a "floor"-with other screening measures that are
appropriate to Jamaican conditions. For example, the Jamaican government
seeks evidence of ties to support an applicant's contention that he is likely
to return to Jamaica. Since applicants are not typically able to provide
documentary evidence of assets that tie them to Jamaica, the MOL uses
supplementary indicators. For example, the operation of a family farm is
typically taken as an indication of home ties. Moreover, the MOL regularly

2500

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77

supplements police reports (which are sometimes unreliable) by utilizing
informal community networks to ensure that potential participants are not
involved in criminal behavior that has not otherwise been detected by
formal state measures. Parties interviewed indicated that it was atypical for
Canada to reject candidates who had been recommended by the Jamaican
government. The MOL is clearly motivated to improve its candidate pool
by the ever-present possibility that Canada could reduce the number of
visas available, particularly given that other countries are clamoring for
similar bilateral arrangements.
Although it is not a matter of official policy, it appears that a preference
exists for candidates from closely knit, typically rural communities, where
persons are likely to be well-known to their neighbors. The MOL currently
designates persons of standing in the rural communities to refer candidates.
These persons typically include parliamentary and local government
representatives, clergy, and social workers. These persons are assigned a
certain number of farm-work "tickets" and are asked only to issue those
tickets to community members who are likely to abide by the program's
terms.
Under the terms of the MOU, the number of visas offered is entirely
within the discretion of Canada. As such, although not explicitly articulated
in the MOU, administrators pointed out that Canada retained the right to
reduce the pool of available visas if the Absent Without Leave (AWOL)
rates were deemed to be unacceptable. The MOL is able to track AWOL
rates closely since they remain in close contact with Canadian employers
and typically arrange return flights to Jamaica for guest workers.
Moreover, all guest workers are required to present evidence of their timely
exit from Canada to the MOL upon their return to Jamaica. If a guest
worker goes AWOL, he is deemed to have committed an immigration
infraction, since remaining "in status" is contingent on maintaining
employment with the specific employer to whom the guest worker was
92
contracted at the time that the visa was originally granted.
The MOL is obligated to report AWOL guest workers expeditiously to
Canada.
It provides briefings to parliamentary representatives, with
warnings issued if high AWOL rates threaten to compromise the ability of a
member of Parliament and her network of recommenders to issue further
referrals. While the MOL generally does not issue outright bans on
particular communities, the MOL indirectly bars the consideration of
persons from their communities (by barring community recommenders).
Penalties may also extend in rare instances to the entire community of
origin. 93
92. See JAMAICAN MINISTRY OF LABOUR, JAMAICA-CANADA PROGRAM HANDBOOK (n.d)
(on file with author).
93. If guest workers are involved in (non-immigration) crimes that have the potential to
compromise the program (such as narcotics trafficking), the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security (MOL or Ministry of Labour) has, in the past, invoked a severe penalty by formally
barring consideration of the entire community of origin for limited time periods. Indeed, in
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All of the subjects interviewed characterized the flexible nature of the
arrangements between Jamaica and Canada as critical to the program's
success, to the extent that it encouraged administrators, pursuant to
regulatory powers granted to them by the Jamaican Parliament, to tweak the
program by promulgating their own rules to meet the changing interests of
the parties and the various stakeholders. 94 The MOL appears to generously
utilize their administrative discretion to tweak the program to respond to
changing conditions on the ground. Administrators noted that, although
they did not have the legal authority to punish guest workers for going
AWOL since infractions were committed in another jurisdiction, they
exercised considerable power to penalize because of their ability to discount
recommendations. In response to obvious justice concerns, stakeholders
also emphasized that, although the arrangements were informal, they were
transparent. For example, there appears to be a strong emphasis on
reinforcing the rules through education. All farm workers must participate
in an orientation class prior to departure from Jamaica that clearly
communicates the penalties for going AWOL for individual farm workers
and their recommenders and the likely reduction in visas if AWOL rates
become too high. This orientation is reinforced upon arrival in Canada by
Jamaican liaison officers prior to workers being deployed to farms.
3. Tale of the Numbers: AWOL Rates Against Other Indicative Data
Points
a. A BriefComparative Background on the American H-2A Program
There are a number of data points that give us an indicative sense of the
success of the Jamaica-Canada program. One such data point is the
disparity in visa-compliance rates between Jamaican guest workers in
Canada and in the United States.9 5 A more detailed statistical analysis is
included in the online database, although relevant summary findings are
one highly publicized incident in which two guest workers were found transporting drugs,
the MOL barred the entire community of origin. Administrators argued that it was highly
likely that community members were aware of these drug crimes, and, as such, it was
reasonable to expect that they would have so warned the MOL. Citing justice concerns,
MOL officials indicated that such bans typically were time-limited.
94. Interview with Chief Liaison Officer, Can.; Permanent Sec'y, Ministry of Labour,
Jam.; Former Senior Advisor, Office of the Prime Minister; and Former Permanent Sec'y,
Ministry of Labour, Jam. (Aug.-Nov. 2007) (notes on file with author).
95. The ideal approach would be a comparative study of U.S. and Canadian guest
worker programs, with the appropriate statistical controls to attempt to account for the
relative contribution of competing explanatory factors to the success of the program.
Agricultural guest workers who travel to Canada and the United States appear broadly
similar in that they originate from similar communities, have similar skill sets, and fill
similar agricultural jobs; systemic differences in program design might lead the programs to
attract different categories of applicants. As intimated earlier, there is clearly the need for a
comprehensive comparative study of similarly situated guest workers who participate in the
U.S. and Canadian programs, with appropriate controls, in an attempt to isolate the relative
contributions of a series of factors that might account for differential compliance rates.
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included below. The comparable population of Jamaican guest workers in
the United States is admitted under the H-2A provisions9 6of the INA, which
govern the admission of agricultural workers to the U.S.
The American program differs from the Canadian program in a number
of ways, but the following differences are worth emphasizing. The program
is generally characterized as being "privatized," which is reflected in a
number of ways. First, there is no bilateral agreement that acts as a framing
device for the promulgation of supplementary rules by the Jamaican
government. Second, unlike the Jamaica-Canada program, in which both
governments play a critical regulatory role, in the United States, employer
groups operate with relatively little oversight and appear to dominate the
recruitment process. To the extent that there is Jamaican government
involvement in the screening process for American guest workers, this is
entirely the result of the voluntary actions of those American employers
who delegate screening to the MOL, as opposed to being built into the
framework of the program by bilateral agreement or incentivized by
97
subsidies such as those offered to employers by the Canadian government.
Third, the Jamaican government plays no role in monitoring the
Unlike Canada-where the Jamaican
compliance of Jamaicans.
government is integrally involved in arranging the return flights for the
guest workers, which puts them in a position to easily identify AWOL
workers, report their immigration infractions to Canada, and express their
disapproval to recommenders and their source-labor communities-the
Jamaican government plays no such role in the United States. Finally,
guest workers are not required to register with the Jamaican government
upon their return home as a condition of receiving the "compulsory
savings," which are deducted from their salaries in Canada but not in the
United States (except by voluntary arrangement). In summary, under the
H-2A framework, Jamaican officials have virtually no influence in choosing
guest workers (except by private arrangement) and monitoring their
compliance while in the United States.
In general, even taking account of population differences and the broader
structural differences in the agricultural sector between Canada and the
United States, Canada is far less reliant than the United States on migrant
farm workers, since the Canadian agricultural sector is more mechanized
and farm work jobs appear to be more attractive to Canadian citizens than
to American nationals. For example, in 2006, the number of migrant farm
workers in Canada totaled 20,274. Of this number, 58% were Mexican,
30% were Jamaican, and the remaining guest workers originated in other
96. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(H) (2000). Changes to the program currently are being

considered. See Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS Proposes Changes txo
Improve H-2A Temporary Agricultural Worker Program (Feb. 6, 2008), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_ 1202308094416.shtm.

97. In the past, there has been intervention by the Jamaican authorities, who, on the basis
of unscrupulous actions by some private recruiters, now require all private recruiters to
register with the government.
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Latin American and Caribbean states. 98 That is, Jamaicans constitute
slightly less than one third of documented migrant farm-worker population.
(While there are not reliable figures on the undocumented population of
farm workers in Canada, it is widely believed to be small.) The Jamaican
government's influence with Canada derives partly from the high levels of
representation of its nationals on both an absolute and per capita basis
among guest workers. In the equivalent year, the U.S. government
approved 56,183 H-2A visas; Jamaican nationals received approximately
10% of the total. 99 These agricultural workers are widely acknowledged to
be a small fraction of the seasonal agricultural workers in the United States
given that the overwhelming majority of migrant farm workers are
undocumented.
b. Comparative statistics

The AWOL rates of Jamaican guest workers in Canada were juxtaposed
with the AWOL rates of a comparable sample of Jamaican guest workers in
the United States.' 00 More specifically, a comparison was done between
the AWOL rates of agricultural workers who entered Canada using
Jamaican passports under visas granted pursuant to the Canadian Seasonal
Agricultural Workers program and H-2A visa recipients who were
agricultural workers and entered the United States using Jamaican
passports.' 0 ' Between 1988 and 2007 (the period on which this analysis
98. THE UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION, THE STATUS OF MIGRANT FARM
WORKERS IN CANADA:
2006-2007, at 6 (2008) [hereinafter STATUS OF MIGRANT FARM
WORKERS]. It is also worth noting that data received from the Canadian High Commission

in Jamaica indicates that migrant workers generally constitute between 35 and 50% of the
total number of Jamaicans who receive nonimmigrant visas to Canada annually (the
overwhelming majority of other recipients are temporary visitor visa holders). This contrasts
with the United States, where guest workers constitute a much smaller percentage of the total
number of Jamaicans who receive nonimmigrant visas. See infra note 99 and accompanying
text.
99. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Department
of Homeland Security Fact Sheet: H-2A Temporary Agricultural Worker Program (Feb. 6,
2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1202308216365.shtm. Notably,
Jamaican H-2A visa recipients constitute a small percentage of Jamaicans who travel to the
United States on nonimmigrant visas each year. H-2A visa recipients generally constitute
less than 10% of the total number of Jamaicans who receive nonimmigrant visas to the
United States annually. For a general sense of the number of Jamaicans who apply and
receive nonimmigrant visas on an annual basis, see Dionne Rose, Post-911 Visa-Application
Boom,
JAM.
GLEANER,
July
20,
2008,
http://www.jamaicagleaner.com/gleaner/20080720/news/news7.html.
100. Going Absent Without Leave (AWOL) is in itself a violation of Canadian law, since
under the terms of the visa, persons are only to remain in Canada as long as they are working
with a specific employer (or for seven days beyond the final date of their labor contract). See
Can.-Jam. MOU, supra note 91. These workers were comprised overwhelmingly (though
not exclusively) of agricultural workers, in which there was some Jamaican governmental
involvement (if only minimal as described above) since workers registered with the MOL,
even if the MOL had more limited power over their selection and return arrangements.
101. See Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance
Appendices tbl.1 (n.d), available at www.outsourcingimmigrationcompliance.com (enter
username "guestworker" and password "guestworker" to access the website). Given the
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has been based), trends in the data show that, in general, far more Jamaican
workers go AWOL in the American guest worker program as compared to
the Canadian program.
The AWOL rates for the twenty-year period of analysis (1988-2007)
show that, on average, 5.3% of all Jamaican guest workers in the United
States go AWOL, with a high of 9.8% in 1988. While in Canada, 3.5% of
all Jamaican guest workers have gone AWOL in that time, with a high of
7.2% in 1988.102
It is important to note that, while the differences between Jamaican
AWOL rates in Canada and the United States may appear to be marginal,
they should be viewed in the context of the large size of the undocumented
population. There are approximately 12 million undocumented aliens, the
overwhelming majority of whom are low-skilled persons who would only
typically qualify for entry as guest workers. 10 3 As such, the difference of
1.8%104 in comparative AWOL rates translates to 216,000 more persons
going AWOL in the United States as compared to Canada if there were an
equivalent population of undocumented aliens there.
Further, statistical analysis 10 5 of the AWOL rates for Jamaican guest
workers in Canada and the United States within the period being examined
demonstrates that there is a statistically significant difference between the
means of the two AWOL rates. The results of the t-test10 6 clearly indicate
passage of the major immigration reform legislation in 1986, the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA), the analysis was done utilizing figures after that date. The figures were
compiled from source data that was provided by the Jamaican Ministry of Labour and Social
Security through its archives and statistical bulletins. See id. tbl.1, nn.1-4. Discrepancies
were identified in the AWOL numbers over the years 1997-2001, where U.S. AWOL
numbers were extremely low in comparison to other years. Administrators in both the U.S.
and Canadian programs agreed that the figures for these years appear to be atypical and,
notably, were not prepared to eliminate the possibility of deficiencies in record keeping, due
to resource constraints at the MOL. As such, AWOL numbers for 1997-2001 were imputed
using Maximum Likelihood (EM) Estimation. See id. tbl. 1, nn. 1-4. The Statistical Package
for the Social Sciences (SPSS 16.0) was used to carry out this analysis.
102. Id. tbl. 1.
103. See Massey & Liang, supra note 23.
104. This percent (1.8%) represents the difference between the average U.S. AWOL rate
of 5.3% and the average Canadian AWOL rate of 3.5% for the twenty-year period of
analysis.
105. The analysis was carried out using the SSPS 16.0. SPSS is a widely recognized
statistical package utilized in social science research. See, e.g., INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM
FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, GUIDE TO SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA PREPARATION AND

ARCHIVING:

BEST PRACTICE THROUGHOUT THE DATA LIFE CYCLE (2005), available at

http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/access/dataprep.pdf.
106. The AWOL rates for guest workers in Canada and the United States were inputted
into SPSS 16.0. See Brown, supra note 101, tbl.1. An independent samples t-test was
performed using "country" as the grouping variable (i.e., the United States and Canada) and
the AWOL rates as the test variable. The means of the test variable (i.e., AWOL rates) were
compared based on the specified values (i.e., Canada and the United States) of the grouping
variable. This test was carried out to determine whether there was a statistically significant
difference between the two sample means. The null hypothesis that was tested is that the
difference between the means of the AWOL rates for guest workers in U.S. and Canadian
programs over the period in review is zero. The alternative hypothesis tested is that the
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that the average higher AWOL rates experienced for Jamaican guest
workers in the United States as compared to Jamaican guest workers in
Canada are not purely random. 10 7 In summary, the high levels of visa
compliance in the Canadian program are striking when viewed against the
background of visa-compliance levels among Jamaican agricultural guest
workers in the United States
0
4. Rationales Governing Compliance Decisions

8

This section seeks to unpack the reasons that subjects offer for
compliance. The study was particularly concerned with whether program
design with an emphasis on legal rules was influential in a formal sense, or
more informally, as mediated by community norms. There are a variety of
sources of "law" that could potentially be influential with subjects. These
include the bilateral arrangement between Canada and Jamaica, regulations
promulgated pursuant to the MOL's administrative discretion, and
Canadian immigration laws. There is also a network of informal rules,
which are obligatory but fall short of formally state-enforced law. Subject
interviews sought to engage the following questions: which laws and/or
difference between the means is not zero. Given the results of the t-test, the null hypothesis
was rejected, in other words, there is a statistically significant difference between the means
(using a significance level of 5%). Imputed data was used in this analysis. See id. tbl.1,
nn. 1-4.
107. See id. tbl.3.
108. For a comprehensive discussion of competing rationales for migratory trends,
please see Douglas Massey, Social Structure, Household Strategies and the
Cumulative Causation of Migration, 56 POPULATION INDEX 3 (1990). A more detailed note
on the methodology in this section, which relies primarily on interviews with guest workers,
is appropriate. The data was collected in two segments. The first segment focused on the
legal framework that governs the Jamaica-Canada program, and exploratory interviews were
conducted with key administrators who draft and enforce the rules that govern the movement
of guest workers. In an effort to include a diverse range of experiences, interviewees
included administrators with varying levels of seniority. I also conducted a focus group with
key administrators.
The second phase focused on the factors that influence the visa-compliance
decisions of guest workers. Detailed interviews were done with dozens of guest workers. I
acknowledge concerns regarding whether the inclination of persons to share candidly might
have been compromised by the absence of anonymity. Given the small size of Jamaica, the
program in particular, and the referral methodology, faculty at the University of the West
Indies, with experience in studying similar populations, indicated that it would be difficult to
credibly assure persons of anonymity. Given this concern, I spent significant amounts of
time cultivating confidence among individual guest worker subjects. The number of guest
workers interviewed was restricted on this basis.
More specifically, I conducted detailed interviews with a small sample of guest
workers, many of whom had been introduced by a member of a rural agricultural
development agency, who regularly interacts with this population for research purposes.
Although this person was employed by the government, he clearly had independently earned
the trust of guest workers through repeated interactions with them over decades. Having
cultivated relationships through his introductions with this smaller pool, the initial
interviewees then provided me with introductions to a larger pool. The criteria for selecting
persons for interviews were reviewed with the assistance of a researcher at the University of
the West Indies, who had previously studied the guest worker population.
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rules matter, how do they become obligatory, and how do they derive their
moral justification?
a. Competing ExplanatoryFrameworks
Prior to turning to the reasons for compliance as told by the guest
workers themselves, it is important to note that competing rationales
emerged for the differential levels of visa compliance in exploratory
interviews with economists at the University of the West Indies who study
Caribbean migratory networks.
The relative contributions of these
competing explanatory factors offer a potentially fertile area for further
study. While agricultural guest workers who travel to Canada and the
United States appear broadly similar in that they originate from similar
communities, have similar skill sets, and fill similar agricultural jobs, the
ideal approach would be a comprehensive comparative study of the U.S.
and Canadian programs, with appropriate controls, in an attempt to isolate
the relative contributions of a series of factors that might account for
differential compliance rates.
There are diverse competing explanatory factors of which only a few are
offered here. First, there may be differential perceptions among Jamaicans
of the comparative attractiveness of the United States and Canada as
immigrant-receiving societies, with a clear preference for the United States.
Second, it may be broadly perceived that the United States has higher
tolerance levels for undocumented immigrants generally. Third, there are
more extensive Jamaican networks in the United States and they are more
socioeconomically heterogeneous. Since modem Canadian immigration
law prioritizes the admission of skilled persons, Jamaican migration to
Canada has been comprised disproportionately of professional persons,
particularly in recent times. The more economically heterogeneous
Jamaican networks in the United States may assimilate undocumented
aliens more easily, with a corresponding reduction in the real and perceived
costs borne by individual undocumented aliens to assimilate in the United
States. 10 9 Researchers also noted that Jamaicans are well represented in
major urban centers in the United States and, as such, farm workers in the
United States are usually relatively close to thriving Jamaican communities.
Jamaican guest workers in Canada are more likely to travel to agricultural
communities that are more rural and remote. l11 Notably, many of these
109. A finding by Catherine Colby with respect to Mexican farm workers in Canada may
be relevant in this regard. She interviewed Mexican guest workers and found that they did
not wish to remain in Canada, primarily because the small, rural Ontario towns where they
worked had no Mexican communities into which they could easily assimilate. CATHERINE
COLBY, FROM OAXACA TO ONTARIO:

IMPACT AT HOME

MEXICAN CONTRACT LABOR IN CANADA AND THE

(1997).

110. Farm workers travel primarily to Canadian agricultural communities, many of which
have historically been rural, although some have become more urban in recent times.
Reflecting the program's historical genesis in Ontario, the representation is particularly
strong in agricultural communities in southwestern Ontario. Tanya Basok, He Came, He
Saw, He ... Stayed. Guest Worker Programmes and the Issue of Non-return, 38 INT'L
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communities remain relatively homogenous-farm workers would typically
have to travel some distance to access Jamaican networks.
Fourth, although agricultural guest workers who travel to Canada and the
United States appear broadly similar, systemic differences in program
design might lead the programs to attract different categories of applicants.
That is, the Canadian program might be more attractive to Jamaicans who
have some broader set of characteristics that are correlated with risk
aversion, who might be more inclined to participate in a program in which
the Jamaican government assumes a clear "caretaker" role, while Jamaicans
who have some broader set of characteristics that are correlated with a
larger risk appetite might be more inclined to choose the United States,
where there is more minimal Jamaican government involvement. These
characteristics (that are correlated with risk appetite) might bear some
relation to the likelihood that individuals will become undocumented."'1
Relatively little academic work has been done in this area and, as such,
the data points are sparse, and one is limited to preliminary inferences. In
light of these competing rationales for the differential levels of visa
compliance among Jamaican guest workers in Canada and the United
States, it is not possible to definitively attribute these differences to
program design without the benefit of further research. Rather, these data
points are meant to be the beginning of a dialogue-a hook for a larger
conversation with a focus on the reasons for visa compliance as told by the
guest workers themselves.
b. The Importance ofIntermediariesto Screening
Nearly all of the subjects were referred to the program on the basis of a
personal relationship with a recommender. Subjects cited relationships
with community leaders, including political representatives, social workers,
clergy, coaches in local sports leagues, and justices of the peace (equivalent
to notary publics)."12 A few others had more indirect relationships and
were introduced to community recommenders by family members or close
113
friends who vouched for their character.

MIGRATION 215, 216 (2000). There are far lower representations of farm workers in other

provinces, but numbers have been increasing in recent years in other provinces. STATUS OF
MIGRANT FARM WORKERS, supra note 98, at 6.

111. Please note that I am utilizing the term risk aversion in a general sense and not in the
more specific academic sense in which it is conventionally utilized in economics and finance
to refer to the behavior of consumers in conditions of uncertainty. Interview with Dillon
Alleyne, Ctr. for Global Dev.; Univ. of the W. Indies (Oct. 2007); Interview with Claremont
Kirton, Univ. of the W. Indies (Mar. 2008); Interview with Claremont Kirton, Univ. of the
W. Indies (June 2007); Interview with Darron Thomas, Univ. of the W. Indies (Mar. 2008);
Interview with Michael Witter, Univ. of the W. Indies (Mar. 2008).
112. Interviews with members of Jamaica Farm Work Programme in Jam. (Sept.-Nov.
2007) [hereinafter Programme Interviews] (subjects include AM, AS, AS, CB, CG, CH, CS,
DB, DD, DD, DJ, DR, DT, DT, DW, EC, EW, FC, G, GB, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P,
RB, RB, RB, RC, RI, RK, RR, S, SB, SP, VH, WD).

113. Id. (subjects include DR, EC, FC, RB).
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Subjects overwhelmingly concurred with the view that a referral from a
community leader who had a relationship with the MOL was integral to
gaining access to the program. 114 None seemed to be perturbed by the
disproportionate role played by political representatives and other
connected parties in the referral process. The consensus view seemed to be
that the MOL expressed a clear preference for persons from tightly knit
communities, who were well-known to their neighbors and who operated
family farms to which they would return. Given the lack of infrastructure
in these communities, it was deemed to be impractical to access these
referral networks without the support of these persons. Subjects seemed to
5
reject any implication that selection processes were exclusionary."1
Several subjects noted that the process was at least partly meritocratic, with
some taking pains to emphasize that they had provided references
to
16
support their contentions of character and a solid farming background.1
c. Why IntermediariesMatter to Subjects
The majority of subjects were repeat participants in the program who
indicated that they counted on their overseas earnings to supplement their
familial income. 1 17 The majority appeared to be of the view that their
repeat selection was dependent not only on positive evaluations from their
employers, but also on the independent maintenance of a good relationship
with the MOL." l 8 Since intermediaries represent their primary ongoing
contact with the MOL for most guest workers, the maintenance of
relationships with intermediaries was believed to be important. 119
5. Overall Rationales for Compliance
All of the interviewees asserted (some quite emphatically) that they had
never considered the possibility of not complying with their visa. A
primary purpose of the interview was to ascertain which rationales
dominated their decision-making matrices. Interviewees cited a variety of
reasons to account for their disinclination to go AWOL. Interviewees
alternatively cited: familial expectations of visa compliance; communal
expectations of visa compliance including specifically such expectations
from religious groups and loose neighborhood affiliations; patriotic
commitments to Jamaica; and obligations to obey the law. There was also a
114. Id. (subjects include AM, AS, AS, CB, CG, CH, CS, DB, DD, DD, DJ, DT, DT,
DW, DR, EC, EW, FC, G, GB, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RB, RC, RJ, RK,
RR, S, SB, SP, VH, WD).
115. Id. (subjects include DR, EC, FC, RB, RC).
116. Id. (subjects include CG, DT, DW, GB, MH, RB, RJ, SP).
117. Id. (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, EC, FC, G, H,
HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RK, RR, S, SB, VH).
118. Id. (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, EC, FC, G, H,
HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RR, RH, S, SB).
119. Id. (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, EC, FC, G, H,
HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RR, RH, S, SB).
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category of rationales that are broadly categorized as "other-worldly,"
which sometimes bore religious overtones. Communal rationales appeared
to predominate. The majority of subjects specifically noted that their
community members expected compliance and they did not want to be held
responsible for compromising either the access of their own community
members or fellow Jamaicans to Canada. 120
a. Law-Related Rationales
One set of rationales might be broadly construed as law-related. All
appeared to be aware of the diverse sources of law, with subjects
alternatively referencing at least two of the following sources: Canadian
law, Jamaican law (which appeared to be synonymous with MOLpromulgated rules), and the relationship between Canada and Jamaica
(which appeared to be synonymous with the bilateral MOU between
Jamaica and Canada). The majority appeared to distinguish between formal
legal obligations (the breach of which carries the threat of state sanction)
and informal obligations, whether they derived from family, community, or
other-worldly commitments. 121 However, amongst all subjects, law-related
rationales appeared to be of only secondary importance in relation to other
rationales. Notably, many subjects indicated that their obligations to
family, community, intermediaries, and church were so important that these
eclipsed formal legal obligations.
b. Norms-Based Rationales
All of the subjects provided reasons that might be broadly characterized
as "norms-based," with their rationales reflecting a clear notion that
returning to Jamaica was not only preferable but also "right" (a term
utilized repeatedly by some interviewees) or "Christian." 122 Subjects cited
a range of value systems that are complementary and that are broadly
sympathetic to compliance. Several subjects indicated that they would
never consider absconding for the same reasons that they would never
consider breaking other laws; absconding was not consistent with value
systems that they held. 123 One subject utilized a patois phrase to connote
the importance of a clear conscience. He had never had reason to "look
124
over his shoulders" before, and had no desire to start now.
Other subjects cited religious commitments. One subject explicitly
declared that "I grow up ...

Baptist so it give me a good settlement of the

120. Id. (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CS, DB, DD, DJ, DT, DT, DR, DW, EC,
EW, FC, G, GB, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RB, RC, RJ, RR, S, SB, SP,

WD).
121. Id. (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, EC, FC, G, H,
HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RH, RR, S, SB, VH).

122. Id. (subjects include AM, CG, DJ, DT, G, H, HR, J, MH, MS, OM, RB, RC, RR,
SB, VH).
123. Id. (subjects include AM, CG, HR, J, MH, MS, OM, RB, RC, RR).
124. Id. (subject DD).
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brain. You know what is wrong and what is right."' 125 As such, choosing
not to return was viewed as a morally inferior course of action. Choosing
not to return home was alternatively characterized as "wutless" (worthless)
126
or behaving like a "bwoy" (connoting a young irresponsible person).
The perception that going AWOL was immoral seemed to be deeply
intertwined with interviewees' perceptions of familial, communal, and
27
national obligations.
c. Community-BasedRationales and the Competitionfor Esteem
Attachments that might be broadly characterized as communal included
obligations to fellow farmers, social clubs, sporting leagues, and church
groups. The importance of communal attachments, and the esteem that
derives from such attachments, was implicit in that several subjects
indicated that they would not have been selected if they had not been held
in high regard. One subject implied that he was recommended because of
his "discipline."' 128 Indeed, some subjects indicated that they derived
further respect from fellow community members each time they were
selected for the program, and they seemed unwilling to compromise this
status.
Subjects spoke not only of their own obligations to community, but also
independently of their perceptions of the communal disapproval that would
befall them and their families if they did not return. 129 Several specifically
referenced a prominent person in the community who had provided them a
referral or had introduced them to a recommender who was anticipating
their return. 130 In sum, it was clear that during their time in Canada,
subjects maintained contact with a broader circle of community members
who communicated their expectations, which appeared relevant to subjects'
decision making.' 31
d. Views ofAbsconders
The majority had either personal knowledge of or individual contact with
a Jamaican guest worker who had gone AWOL. 132 Notably, all of the
subjects emphasized that they did not maintain ongoing relationships with
these persons and emphasized that these persons had not come from their
125. Id. (subject DW).

126. Id. (subject CG).
127. Id. (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, EC, FC, G, H,
HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RK, RR, S,SB, VH).
128. Id. (subject DW).
129. Id. (subjects include AM, CH, DB, DR, EC, FC, G, H, HR, J, L, M, MS, OM, P, RB,
RB, RC, RR, S, SB, WD).
130. Id. (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CS, DD, DJ, DT, DT, DW, EW, FC, G, GB,
H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RJ, RR, S,SB, SP, WD).
131. Id. (subjects include AM, CB, CG,DD, DJ, DT, HR, MH, OM).
132. Id. (subjects include AM, AS, AS, CB, CG,CH, CS, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, DT,
DW, EC, EQ, FC, G, GB, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RB, RC, RI, RK, RR,
S, SB, SP, VH, WD).

2009]

OUTSOURCING IMMIGRATION COMPLIANCE

2511

communities. Only one person noted that he had personal knowledge of
someone in his community who had gone AWOL. All of the interviewees
were deeply intolerant of persons who went AWOL and some interviewees
seemed offended at the notion that they would ever associate with such
persons.
A majority of those interviewed seemed to sympathize with the view that
there was a significant minority (but nevertheless, they emphasized, a
minority) of potential guest workers who sought access to the program,
with either an intention to abscond in Canada or at least a willingness to
consider the possibility of absconding in Canada.133 As one interviewee put
it, "[g]rowing up, we all heard of persons who had gone away to farm, and
then disappeared."' 134 While each of the interviewees contended that they
personally would never go AWOL or even consider going AWOL, the
consensus view seemed to be that persons from "country" (that is, rural
Jamaicans) were different from "town persons." 135 The key differentiating
factor between "town" and "country" persons in the subjects' minds was
communal ties. Subjects noted that there was some incongruence between
the broader social definitions of illegality with respect to immigration and
the formal definition of illegality, particularly among "town persons." One
noted that, among many such persons, illegal immigration was not
perceived to be a big deal ("ah nuh nutten" in Jamaican patois). 136 In the
context of this broader ambivalent view of illegality, they seemed to believe
that disappearance was entirely understandable, even as they viewed it
negatively.
e. Group Accountability and Views of Sanctions
The perceived certainty and severity of sanctions appeared to be relevant
to decision making. Several interviewees noted their awareness of the
certainty and severity of sanctions in the event that they absconded.
Notably, they were far less likely to cite the formal sanctions that were
likely to be levied by Canada than the sanctions that would be levied by the
Jamaican government and the loss of respect that they would experience in
137
their communities.
133. Id. (subjects include AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, DW, EC, FC, G, G, H,
J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RK, RR, S, SB, SB, VH).

134. Id. (subject VH) (translation).
135. Id. (subjects include AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, DW, EC, FC, G, L, M,
MH, P, RB, RH, S, SB, VH).

136. Id. (subject MH).
137. The subjects clearly understood deportation to be a sanction, although one might
question the basis on which deportation might reasonably be construed as a sanction. If a
guest worker overstays his visa, and the host country deports him, why is this not simply an
enforcement of a contractual obligation that the guest worker agreed to (as a condition of his
visa) in the first place? This question seems particularly pertinent in light of the longtime
debate in the immigration law literature as to whether deportation should in fact be viewed
as a punishment. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding
that "an order of deportation is not a punishment for crime"); cf Legomsky, supra note 11
(arguing that theories of deportation overlap so substantially with those of criminal
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The overwhelming view among subjects was that the MOL's utilization
of collective sanctions was fair, particularly since it was perceived that such
sanctions were utilized sparingly. The rule was clearly familiar, with one
subject noting that "from ancient days from when I was small you heard
about [persons] who run off and don't come back," and another deeming
such persons to be "selfish" since they were aware that the community
would suffer the consequences of their actions. 138 Only one subject
questioned the appropriateness of collective sanctioning. Another subject
noted that residents of rural communities were far better placed than the
authorities to identify and bring pressure to bear on those who were at risk
of being noncompliant. Importantly, subjects seemed sympathetic to the
rationale that had been offered by MOL officials for their inclination to
penalize community leaders who recommended absconders (and thus
indirectly the community) by noting that these principles were already built
into the program by Canada, since Jamaicans as a whole would risk losing
visa slots if AWOL rates become unacceptable. As such, given this broader
constraint that was perceived to be connected to the inherently competitive
Canadian labor market, the MOL's actions were deemed to be reasonable.
While subjects did not make specific references to the Jamaica-Canada
bilateral arrangements, they seemed generally to recognize that there was a
formal process in which Jamaica was being held accountable to Canada. It
also seemed clear that they recognized that the rules of the MOL were
formulated pursuant to this process. Indeed, several subjects noted that they
believed that Jamaica would "embarrass" itself (i.e., lose face) with the
Canadians if too many persons went AWOL. 139 These subjects also
seemed to believe that this would compromise Jamaica's negotiating
position, since they specifically referenced their fears that Jamaicans would
lose precious farm work slots. One subject argued that law-abiding
Jamaicans had suffered because of the generally poor reputation of
Jamaicans overseas and MOL had an obligation to prevent persons from
going overseas who would further contribute to this negative perception.
f. Concluding Thoughts
Generally, subject interviews support the notion that legal rules are
influential in a formalistic sense, but more importantly, that they are
Community norms are influential,
mediated by community norms.
independent of their relationship to formal legal rules. While it is debatable
whether many of the sources of obligation are in fact "law," they are clearly
important in the subjects' decision-making matrices. Both formal and
punishment that deportation should at least sometimes be regarded as a form of punishment).
See generally Annmarie Barnes, Transnational Dislocations: The Use of Deportation as
Crime Control (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
138. Programme Interviews, supra note 112 (subjects include DT, SP).
139. Programme Interviews, supra note 112 (subjects include AS, CH, DB, DR, EC, FC,
G, H, L, M, P, RB, RH, S, SB, VH). This message is clearly communicated in the MOL's
orientation literature. JAMAICAN MINISTRY OF LABOUR, supra note 92.

2009]

OUTSOURCINGIMMIGRATION COMPLIANCE

2513

informal sanctions appeared to comport with their notions of just deserts.
There are clearly persons who play a disproportionate role in the norm
enforcement process. These persons are precisely the persons who have
been selected by the MOL to screen, sanction, and generally help ensure
compliance.
III. WHY THIS NEW APPROACH WORKS

A. Information Asymmetry
Recall that the primary goal of any immigration law regime is only to
admit persons who comport with expressed immigration goals. For guest
worker regimes, a primary criterion is short-term tenure. Recall also that
typically an applicant's type is not apparent to the screener. Indeed, in
some instances, even the applicant may be unaware of her type. Consider,
for example, Applicant X who is genuinely unsure whether or not she
would prefer to enter the United States for the short term or the long term,
but decides to apply for short-term entry. Consider Applicant Y who knows
that she wants to enter for the long term but, given her low-skill level, is
unable to enter the United States other than as a guest worker. Notably,
neither Applicant X nor Applicant Y will reveal her type to screeners,
although their motives are completely different. Applicant X is genuinely
not in a position to reveal her type, while Applicant Y will not reveal her
type since it will undermine her application if she does so.
The controversy surrounding former-President George W. Bush's
proposal to revise the guest worker provisions of the INA reflects in part a
widespread view that the American government is poorly placed to either
access or evaluate ex ante predictive information about which types are
really short-term. The Jamaica-Canada case study seems to suggest that, by
virtue of proximity to their nationals, source-labor countries may be better
placed to access information that might be utilized as a proxy for visa
compliance. It seems reasonable to generalize this intuition regarding
institutional design beyond the particulars of the Jamaica-Canada case
study.
Indeed, at first glance, this point seems obvious. After all, the sourcelabor country is more proximate to the predictive information. But there is
a more subtle and arguably more important point. Among high-skilled or
high-income applicants who seek to travel to the United States temporarily,
there are regularly utilized proxies for short-term type, such as ties to the
home country as evidenced by financial assets or professional ties. Lowskilled persons are generally not in a position to provide such evidence. In
developing countries such as Jamaica, where informality is pervasive in
institutions, source-labor governments are better placed to identify proxies
for short-term type and to evaluate this proxy information.
For example, in the Jamaican context, MOL officials favor applicants
with a history of agricultural work and show a particular preference for
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small farmers who work on their own farms. Successful operation of one's
own farm is taken to be a proxy for short-term type. Since the formal
system of land titling is poor, it is generally not realistic to expect farmers
to provide documentary evidence that they own farms, much less
independent evidence that they operate such farms.
This is where insiders, who are the subject of the next section, become
critical.' 40 Although applicants may not have independent documentation,
through insiders, MOL officials are able to access communal networks,
which allow them to audit applicants' contentions that they work their own
farms. Moreover, references from insiders serve as testimonials to
character. These are essentially substitutes for more formal proxies of
home-country ties, which the United States is far worse placed to either
access or evaluate.
B. Insiders
Notably, the program's results appear to be at least partially contingent
on the utilization of recommenders who have close ties with a network of
persons in rural communities and are in a position to evaluate and share
with the authorities their evaluations of visa applicants. In one sense, this
finding is unremarkable. These persons appear to be prototypical insiders,
in that they have access to inside information that is valuable but is not
readily available to others. They have been incentivized by the government
to share such information.
Yet, while it is technically accurate to characterize community leaders as
insiders, this term does not begin to capture the full extent of the role of
community leaders. The government has ongoing relationships with guest
workers, which are mediated at least partially through the community
leaders. Community leaders play a critical compliance-maintenance role
through their ongoing relationships, which allows them to monitor persons
whom they have recommended. Moreover, when persons defect, they play
a role in sanctioning. As such, the leaders' activities arguably have
penumbra deterrence effects. Through their activities, the United States
appears to have simultaneously benefited from an outsourcing of the
compliance norm-reification function (with its arguably positive effects on
visa-compliance rates).
As such, given the ongoing mediating relationships provided by
community leaders, they are prototypical intermediaries in trust. 14 1 A
striking feature of the inquiry is that both administrator and guest worker
interviewees noted that the program will not generally take persons from
140. Insiders are referred to as intermediaries in trust in the next section.
141. The concept of an intermediary in trust is captured in the following: Suppose Party
A and Party B are considering a relationship that will be based at least partially on trust but
have no reason to trust each other. A and B may be willing to enter into such a relationship
if there is an intermediary (Party C) with whom they both have a trusting relationship (that
is, A comes to trust B because both A and B trust C). See COLEMAN, supra note 75, at 180-

85.
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particular communities if they do not have an effective intermediary in this
community. The rationale for this institutional design choice was that
community leaders play a much broader role than simply information
gathering and evaluation. Interviewees also emphasize their role as the
guardians and enforcers of compliance norms, which is the subject of the
next section.
C. Intermediariesin Trust as Guardiansof Compliance Norms
1. Connecting the Ethnographic Research to the Theory
There is a long-standing, expansive, and sometimes unwieldy inquiry
into the impact of norms on law abidance arising from interdisciplinary
studies of law, anthropology, sociology, and economics. 14 2 Like much of
the law and norms literature, the evidence here cited is largely illustrative
and qualitative rather than systematic and quantitative. Although the debate
about what is "legal" is beyond the scope of this Article, subjects feel
obligated to follow certain rules, irrespective of formal legal arrangements,
because of an internalized moral commitment or fear of informal sanctions.
They understand that these obligations derive not only from the
immigration laws of the labor-importing country (and the corresponding
formal sanctions), but also from informal bilateral obligations, rules
formulated under source-country administrator discretion, and rules
enforced by community-level leaders. The range of sources of "law"
(beyond formal enforceable Canadian and Jamaican law) strengthens not
only the legitimacy of law, but also compliance with law. Of all of these
sources, communal norms appear to be most influential, since subjects
understand them to be constitutive. Communal norms are clearly deeply
intertwined with perceptions of legal obligation.
For reasons of analytical simplicity, this Article distinguishes between
two sets of norms. It appears that there are a group of norms, which are
complementary and which are broadly sympathetic to compliance. I refer
to these in shorthand as compliance norms. Simultaneously, it also appears
that there are a group of norms that are in tension with the first set of norms
142. For excellent summaries of the anthropological and sociological contributions to the
norms literature, see MOORE, LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 76. See also ABEL,
supra note 76; Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of
Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle:
Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986).
Richard McAdams's article contains a discussion of the secondary economics-influenced
norms literature. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 339-50 (1997); see also ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585

(1998); Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998);
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 962-91 (1995);
Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Cass

R. Sunstein, Social Norms and SocialRoles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). For an example
of norms enthusiasm in the criminal context, see Kahan, supra note 58.
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and are broadly dismissive of compliance.
I refer to these as
noncompliance norms. However, in a complex social world, we may
reasonably intuit that norms are inevitably fluid, contested, complex, and at
times even contradictory. The experiences of the subjects confirm this
intuition. Subjects' decision making becomes especially complex when
norms cut in different directions.
Surprisingly, immigration law appears largely untouched by the norms
scholarship in any of its manifestations. The following section argues that
the proposal is effective partly because institutions have been designed to
grant esteem so as to leverage the power of intermediaries in trust to
augment norms and, in so doing, increase the likelihood of visa compliance.
2. The Role of Intermediaries in Trust in Granting Esteem
and Buttressing Norms
McAdams contends that "the initial force behind norm creation is the
desire individuals have for respect or prestige, that is, for the relative
esteem of others."' 14 3 Individuals care about how they are evaluated not in
the abstract but in relation to others, and, as such, the competition for
esteem is inherently relative.
Interviews with subjects confirm the
importance of the MOL's nomination/referral system, which identifies
participants by privileging particular categories of recommenders. It is not
coincidental that the screening function has been partially delegated to these
community leaders. They are effective screeners at least partly because, as
intermediaries in trust, they care about the esteem in which they are held by
government and the larger community. Moreover, they play a critical role
in granting esteem within their communities. Notably, some subject
interviewees expressed the view that their own prioritization of visa
compliance was driven at least partially by the need to avoid disapproval
(which, of course, is the converse of the competition for approval) from
their recommenders.
These intermediaries are persons who are not only influential in the
community, but who also independently experience intrinsic rewards in
learning about these norms and spreading them. 144 For example, clergy,
who presumably experience intrinsic rewards in identifying and articulating
norms in their sermons, often play this role. 145 The same is true of social
workers, justices of the peace, and so forth. These persons are analogous to
those who are known in the norms literature as mavens, 146 namely, persons
143. McAdams, supra note 142, at 342.
144. The sociology literature refers to these persons as "intermediaries in trust." See
generally COLEMAN, supra note 75, ch. 8.

145. For example, some interviewees cited the importance of religious leaders and
coaches in guiding their decision making more generally, and in this area in particular.
146. Malcolm Gladwell has offered a theory of how fads reach a tipping point and then
cascade. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE 140-46 (2000). In Gladwell's terminology, a "maven" finds her participation in
the norm-generation process intrinsically rewarding and is incentivized to learn about
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who exercise particular sway in the norm-generation process. 14 7 When
persons who have been nominated by these mavens go AWOL or engage in

future
discount
officials
the
government
offenses,
criminal
recommendations from these mavens and, in rare instances, prevent them
from providing further recommendations.

In so doing, the officials deny

these community members access to the program for a limited period.
Therefore, the government incentivizes mavens to screen carefully and to
be judicious guardians of the norms that they have played a role in either

generating or articulating.

These mavens appear to be prototypical

governmental advisors in that they interface with the MOL on behalf of

potential guest workers from their communities. Although they do not act
as guarantors in the conventional sense, if their advice proves to be faulty,
they do experience the following critical loss, namely, credibility. 14 8 This
has significant implications for the ability of mavens to49credibly lobby the
government on behalf of future potential guest workers. 1

The critical point is that competition for esteem plays a significant role at
all levels of the process. First, recommenders are competing for esteem
from the government. Notably, when Jamaican authorities discount the
references of recommenders (when AWOL rates become too high), they are
essentially "dressing-down" persons of standing in their communities and,
in so doing, publicly questioning the value of their judgments. Second,
guest workers are competing for esteem from recommenders. Third, guest

workers are competing for esteem within their communities. Although
guest workers command esteem in their communities (as "man a yard," or
emerging norms and then share that knowledge freely with others. As such, information is
spread widely and at a low cost. Id. at 62. A "connector," on the other hand, contributes to
the norm-generation process simply by virtue of her large number of personal contacts and
relationships that allows her to "connect" to large numbers of persons. Id. at 38. Gladwell's
argument is that fads spread through mavens and connectors until they reach a "tipping
point." Id. at 255-56. This argument clearly has implications for the norm-generation
process. See also Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative
Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1228 (1997) (developing game
theoretic models of normative cascades); Sunstein, supra note 142, at 929-30 (on the role of
norm-entrepreneurs).
147. These persons are referred to in the law review literature utilizing a variety of terms.
For example, Cass Sunstein uses the term norm entrepreneurs to speak of actors who
promote the change of norms. Sunstein, supra note 142. Robert Ellickson utilizes a variety
of terms to distinguish between the differing roles of those who supply and enforce new
norms. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Marketfor Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 1012 (2001). For example, "change agents" are relatively early suppliers and enforcers of new
norms. Id. Within change agents, Ellickson distinguishes among several categories of
persons, including self-motivated leaders, norm entrepreneurs, and opinion leaders. Id.; see
also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory ofPrivacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005).
148. As James Coleman notes, "the advisor's only stock in trade is the credibility of his
advice, and if his advice proves incorrect, his loss is in the trustworthiness of his judgment in
the eyes of those he has advised." COLEMAN, supra note 75, at 181.
149. As such, although they do not experience the financial loss typically associated with
a guarantor, they do experience loss in their primary currency, namely, credibility, and the
loss is nevertheless significant.
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"big man," in Jamaican parlance), this esteem is highly contingent on the
guest workers' ability to play a continuing role as providers.
It is plausible that the granting of esteem is bidirectional between
recommenders and guest workers (that is, just as recommenders can deny
esteem to guest workers, guest workers can deny esteem to recommenders
if, through poor judgment, they compromise their ability to deliver future
recommendations to community members).
This raises an obvious
question. Is the denial of esteem also bidirectional between guest workers
and government and between recommenders and government?
Theoretically, the denial of esteem may be bidirectional between guest
workers and the government and between recommenders and the
government. Yet, as a practical matter, guest workers and recommenders
appear to lack tangible mechanisms of denying esteem to the MOL officials
if they make unfair judgments or if they, through their own poor screening,
compromise the overall program, since the Jamaican Prime Minister or
Cabinet appear unlikely to overturn MOL decisions. However, guest
workers and recommenders do, in fact, have a mechanism of denying
esteem since the Minister, the most senior official at the MOL with
administrative responsibility, is an elected official. Indeed, the voting booth
may represent the ultimate mechanism of denying esteem. As such, the
denial of esteem may theoretically also be bidirectional between guest
workers and the government.
3. Setting the Framework for Government Intervention
Interviewees suggested that visa-compliance norms were not prioritized
in the broader population and specifically among "town" people. There is
convincing evidence that historically visa-compliance norms have not been
influential in the context of the broader Jamaican society and more
specifically in the urban communities that comprise over half of the
population. 150 This evidence arises from a variety of sources, including
more generally sociohistorical studies of Jamaican attitudes to offenses
committed overseas including immigration offenses.
Indeed, one
commentator utilizes the term "normative inversion" to capture the
150. The anthropologist of law, Sally Merry, has contended that lawmaking in ex-colonial
societies remains deeply influenced by a colonial infrastructure, and the purpose that law had
served in such an infrastructure, namely, policing social boundaries, has undermined the
legitimacy of law in the wider population. See Sally Engle Merry, The Criminalization of
Everyday Life, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 14 (Austin Sarat et al. eds.,

1998). It is in this broader historical context that the Jamaican attitudes toward law abidance
generally have been contextualized. While there has not been comprehensive survey data on
Jamaican attitudes toward law abidance, there is extensive evidence that lawmaking suffers
from a legitimacy gap in urban communities, which manifests itself at least partly in
dismissive attitudes toward law abidance. See generally ANTHONY HARRIOTT, POLICE AND
CRIME CONTROL IN JAMAICA:

PROBLEMS OF REFORMING EX-COLONIAL CONSTABULARIES

(2000); see also DENIS BENN, THE CARIBBEAN-AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 1774-2003
(2004); GORDON K. LEWIS, MAIN CURRENTS IN CARIBBEAN THOUGHT: THE HISTORICAL
EVOLUTION OF CARIBBEAN SOCIETY IN ITS IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS, 1492-1900 (1983); BRIAN
MEEKS, NARRATIVES OF RESISTANCE: JAMAICA, TRINIDAD, THE CARIBBEAN (2000).
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"incongruence between social and legal definitions of some categories of
crime."15 1 This manifests itself in a broader tendency to exempt persons
who have committed crimes overseas (including immigration-related
crimes), which result in deportation, from negative moral judgments, since
their activities are justified as entrepreneurial attempts to survive in a
difficult economic climate. 152 Indeed, visa noncompliance was viewed as a
relatively benign activity because it was not perceived as compromising a
person's abilities to enter into the cooperative contractual arrangements that
are necessary for economic survival. (Indeed, administrators noted that
many persons justified their visa noncompliance as a mechanism of
ensuring their53 continuing ability to provide for their families
economically.)1
Some interviewees contend that these attitudes manifest themselves in
In the absence of
evidence of noncompliant behavior overseas.
comprehensive research, some preliminary indicators are in order. Jamaica
has the highest per capita rate of deportation from both Canada and the
United States in the world, 154 and a recent study provides further
preliminary evidence that high proportions of Jamaicans commit
immigration-related offences in the United States. 15 5 Unlike other Latin
American countries whose nationals have high rates of immigration-related
offences, very few Jamaicans enter as undocumented aliens. 156 Virtually all
Jamaicans who enter the United States are visa recipients who have
presumably been prescreened. 157 These high rates of visa noncompliance
have been a source of ongoing concern to successive governments, who
contend that such behavior undermines the likelihood of overseas travel by
other Jamaicans and in so doing threatens to compromise remittances,

151. HARRiOTT,supra note 150, at xvii. Anthony Harriott's work bears similarities to the
landmark ethnographic study that was conducted by Elijah Anderson in Philadelphia. See
ANDERSON, supra note 13; see also MEEKS, supra note 150. Randall Kennedy and Regina
Austin have offered comparable arguments to account partially foi high levels of crime in
American urban centers. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW (1997); Regina
Austin, "The Black Community, " Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1769 (1992).
152. HARRIOTT, supra note 150.
153. Id.
154. Interview with Chief Technical Officer, Ministry of Nat'l Sec., Jam. (Nov. 2007);
see also ANNEMARIE BARNES & ANDREA MCCALLA, A STUDY ON CRIMINAL DEPORTATION,
PREPARED FOR THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE PLANNING INSTITUTE OF
JAMAICA (2006). The figures for the United Kingdom are similarly high.
155. For a broader discussion of high levels of noncompliance by Jamaicans with
immigration laws, see Madjd-Sadjadi & Alleyne, supra note 83.
156. Jamaica and other Caribbean countries are often referred to as part of the larger Latin
American region given their proximity to Latin American neighbors. Other Latin American
counties whose nationals appear to have very high rates of noncompliance with immigration
laws as indicated by rates of deportation include Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico,
Guatemala, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. See David Brotherton, The Deportees, 37(2)
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMs., Sept./Oct. 2003, at 8, 8-11; Donna DeCesare, Deported
'Home'to Haiti, 32(3) NACLA REPORT ON THE AMS., Nov./Dec. 1998, at 6, 6-10.
157. See Madjd-Sadjadi & Alleyne, supra note 83.
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which play a critical role in the economy. 158 The institutional design
innovations discussed here arise in part from a concerted effort to develop a
program that screens effectively and holds noncompliant Jamaicans
accountable.
In this context, it is significant that this study suggests that, among a
certain subset of guest workers, the social meanings attributed to
immigration violations are entirely different from the indifference with
which they appear to be treated in other sections of the society. Among the
subjects in this study, there was no evidence of "normative inversion" as
manifested in dismissive attitudes to noncompliant behavior. There was
minimal evidence of a tendency to discount the seriousness of going
AWOL.
Rather, workers were strikingly consistent in their moral
condemnation of those who did not comply with visa terms who were
alternatively described as "selfish," "foolish," and "wutless," among other
condemnatory descriptions. They view their own decisions to comply not
just as rational economic decisions, but as evidence of their moral fiber,
which distinguishes them from those who go AWOL.
4. Government Signaling Through Institutional Design
There is little doubt that the symbolic meanings attributed to immigration
violations are decidedly negative in the communities from which the
interview subjects originate. Eric Posner's account of the development and
evolution of norms may be helpful in this instance. 159 Posner prioritizes the
link between symbols (and symbolic behaviors) and norms, since "people's
effort to show respect for them [i.e., symbols] lead to significant forms of
conformity that can be described as social norms. ' 160 Posner utilizes a
model in which persons engage in symbolic behaviors to encourage others
to cooperate with them by sending signals. Prioritizing a particular norm
allows a person to signal to the community that he is a "good type" who
seeks to enter into a cooperative relationship.
Although sending a signal entails costs, those who value the gains that
are associated with cooperative relationships will invest in sending signals
to provide evidence of their "type." If enough persons invest in sending
signals, the result is a signaling equilibrium, in which several outcomes may
occur. For example, the good types may consistently send signals and thus
158. A former Jamaican Prime Minister has argued that this tendency to discount

deportation-related offenses has had profoundly negative implications for Jamaica's social
and economic development. See Honorable Prime Minister P. J. Patterson, Address at the
Opening of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the
Caribbean Community (July 4, 2004), available at http://www.caricom.org/jsp/speeches/25
hgc-patterson.jsp; see also Marc Lacey, No Paradisefor Criminals Deported to Jamaica,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, at A13; Most Honorable Portia Simpson-Miller, Jamaican Prime
Minister, Keynote Address to the Conference on the Caribbean, Wash., D.C. (June 19, 2007)

(on file with author).
159. Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998).

160. Id. at 767.
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match up with other good types (thus distinguishing themselves from the
bad types, who choose not to send the signal). There may also obtain
instead
a
"pooling
equilibrium"
in
which
both
good
types and bad types have similar assessments of the relative costs and gains
associated with signals. As such, either all choose to invest or all choose
not to invest in signaling, leading to no real differentiation between the
types.
A state seeking to influence norms has several choices, which appear to
have been utilized in varying degrees by the Jamaican officials. By
subsidizing the cost of sending a "good type" signal and increasing the cost
of sending a "bad type" signal, the state can augment the good signals,
which accompany compliance norms. Indeed, this is precisely what the
Jamaican government did by providing clear esteem-based (and by
extension, economic) benefits to "good types," and simultaneously
highlighting the disadvantages of being a "bad type." When persons
become guest workers, they significantly improve their economic standing
and there are clear spin-off effects for the broader community. By publicly
advertising that "good types" may be eligible for a range of benefits
(including recognition as recommenders), the government may also have
affected the benefits that norm entrepreneurs gained from both sending
signals and constructing new signals (that are supportive of visa
compliance). Moreover, through communal networks, the government
publicizes its knowledge of defectors, while emphasizing that the MOL was
likely to look more skeptically at other applicants from the same
community. Through such repeated public denunciation of defectors, it
appears that the government imposed a real cost on defectors and their
families.
Government signaling appears to have been particularly
influential in certain small rural communities, since it is virtually
impossible to keep designation as a "bad type" confidential in these
communities.
This governmental action may have had a secondary important impact.
The government may have influenced beliefs about the relative prevalence
of both good and bad types. Indeed, this may have been reflected in the
general view among interviewees that, while there were bad types in other
communities, such bad types did not generally belong to their communities.
They were generally likely to see their neighbors consistently as "good
16
types." '

161. In so doing, at the risk of stating the obvious, by imposing group accountability rules
(even indirectly), the government is also increasing the (perceived) payoff that both senders
and receivers will gain from cooperation.
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IV. ANSWERING OBJECTIONS: THE SU1 GENERIS, CORRUPTION AND
HALLIBURTON CONCERNS, VERTICAL OUTSOURCING, AND A PROPOSAL
A. Anticipating Critiques
This section anticipates a number of critiques. First, the critique might
reasonably be made that this case study is sui generis. More specifically,
Jamaica's small size, and the fact that guest workers originate from
homogenous, closely knit rural agricultural communities might undermine
the case study's applicability to larger, less tightly knit societies from which
many documented and undocumented low-skilled workers in the United
States currently originate. The second critique concerns the potential for
corruption. Third, the proposal is also susceptible to the critique that it
excludes those who are "network poor," namely, those who do not have
access either to a community leader or to a broader community of persons
with whom they have ongoing relationships who are able to provide
testimonials as to their suitability for visas. I include a modified proposal
that aims to mitigate this critique.
I refer to the fourth critique succinctly as the Halliburton critique; the
term "outsourcing" has taken on a pejorative tone and the proposal is likely
to be particularly controversial in the immigration context, especially
against a backdrop in which immigration and national security are deeply
intertwined. The question necessarily arises: can the United States expect
other countries to reliably meet their screening and sanctioning
commitments?
1. The Sui Generis Critique
Most documented and undocumented low-skilled workers currently
originate from communities that are less closely knit within larger societies.
Indeed, even within Jamaica, one might have concerns about the
applicability of the model outside of rural areas; there are communities with
diverse forms of social organizations and differing kinship systems. If this
1 62
is true within Jamaica, it is even more likely to be true outside Jamaica.
The question becomes, to what degree do the results in this Article reflect
particular context, circumstance, and culture?
In part, this is an inherent limitation of the case study approach; it is
difficult to specify the relative contribution of diverse factors to visa
compliance in the context of one case study. Ideally, this concern would be
addressed through comparative empirical study of the effectiveness of
similar programs in diverse source-labor contexts. In the absence of such

162. Moreover, the success of the program may also be influenced by the close historical
relationship between Jamaica and Canada. Both Jamaica and Canada share a commonwealth
bond and a history of cooperation arising out of the British colonial experience. This
concern ideally would be addressed though comparative empirical study of the effectiveness
of similar programs in diverse labor-importing contexts.
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work, this section offers some preliminary thoughts in this regard with
respect to the applicability of this model to a more diverse range of sourcelabor communities.
One might begin with the general intuition that the proposal is more
likely to be applicable where the source-labor community has conditions
which approximate those that exist in rural Jamaican agricultural
communities. What would these conditions be? One might intuit that these
would include the presence of a sufficiently tight knit source-labor
community that allows members a practical mechanism of monitoring the
behavior of their peers, a concern among individual members about how
they are perceived in relation to other members of the community, and the
existence of a mechanism of sanctioning for deviations from generally
expected communal standards. The effectiveness of such a program is
likely to be further amplified if there is a broader concern about the group's
reputation and a perception that the behavior of individual group members
has implications for the broader group's reputation.
In the absence of specific comparative work, there is related work from
the anthropology and experimental economics literature that might be
broadly applicable.
These studies address how resource-constrained
communities in developing countries solve the social dilemmas that they
face, put in place sanctioning systems, and effectively promote cooperation
in the absence of law. These generally include risk-pooling arrangements
and in particular, common pool resources (CPR) management. More
specifically, these social dilemmas range from informal agricultural
insurance arrangements to arrangements for monitoring access to herding
163
grounds for cattle to rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs).
Although the Jamaica-Canada program has not been viewed in this
Article through the analytical lens of risk-pooling arrangements, this project
could also be conceptualized in this manner. As is the case in the
microcredit context, where group members carry the risk of loan default (as
opposed to only the individual borrower as in conventional banking
arrangements), similarly, community members carry the risk of visa
overstay (as opposed to only the individual guest worker). 164 Similarly, this
project may also be viewed through the analytical lens of CPR if the
communal reputation is conceptualized as a CPR on which an aspiring

163. For a good summary of some of the research in this area, see Abigail Barr, Marleen
Dekker & Marcel Fafchamps, Risk Sharing Relations and Enforcement Mechanisms (Ctr. for
the Study of African Economies, Working Paper No. 2008-14, 2008), available at
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/wps-list.html.
For a good summary of the
literature on Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) see Timothy Besley et al.,
The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 386 (Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Roy eds., 2001).
164. For a discussion of microcredit in the context of the risk-pooling literature, see
BEATRIZ ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & JONATHAN MORDUCH, THE ECONOMICS OF
MICROFINANCE 147-77 (2005).
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guest worker may draw to attain a visa, and which she will deplete by
65
defection.'
While a detailed discussion of specific studies is beyond the scope of this
Article, in broad outline, the studies generally investigate the prevalence of
cooperative behavior in risk pooling and CPR management. In diverse poor
communities in developing countries, members display a willingness to
behave in a prosocial manner and reward others who do, while punishing
those who do not, even when such actions are costly to themselves.
Generally, these arrangements are broadly characterized by informal yet
clearly defined rules, effective monitoring (and occasionally specific
designation of monitors), accountability of monitors to the broader
community, graduated sanctioning that is proportionate to the degree of
66
transgression, and clear conflict resolution mechanisms. 1
One approach to resolving questions of broader applicability of this
proposal may be to find communal contexts in which broadly comparable
arrangements already exist. It may then be possible to design guest visa
programs that leverage mechanisms of monitoring the behavior of members
that are already in place. It is not possible on the current evidence to say
that the model is broadly applicable. It is simply possible to say that,
intuitively, it would seem reasonable to presume that the model has some
broader applicability beyond the particulars of this study if the source-labor
67
communities share similar characteristics. 1
2. The Corruption Concern
The corruption concern is not unique to this proposal. In any visaallocation program, typically, the number of qualified applicants will
exceed the number of visa slots. Therefore, the potential rent-seeking
problems are apparent in that community leaders will have powerful
incentives to choose from within the group of qualified applicants those
who are willing to offer bribes. A community leader may still be able to
keep her AWOL rate low, thus assuring that she will retain her positions,

165. The most comprehensive discussion of Common Pool Resources (CPR) including an
introduction for the nontechnical reader is contained in ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30-33 (1990).

166. A good summary can be found in FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY: ECONOMIC
EXPERIMENTS

AND ETHNOGRAPHIC

EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES,

(Joseph Henrich et al. eds., 2004).
167. Simultaneously, there may be differences in the applicability of this model to
different societies, depending on a variety of factors including the extent to which it is
possible to maintain close communal ties even when guest workers leave their communities
of origin for temporary periods to work; the pervasiveness of reputational effects across state
lines; and the credibility and effectiveness of the state as an actor in the communities from
which guest workers originate. This leads to the intuition that, even as the model may have
broader applicability, it may need to be modified to suit particular society-specific contexts.
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and earn some extra income in the process. So, she might figure, why not
168
take a bribe?
In this particular proposal, the corruption concern is arguably augmented.
How so? This project has significant analogies to a series of recent
innovations among development practitioners that seek to leverage social
networks to collateralize assets that had previously been unattainable by
poor communities. For example, recent initiatives by the World Bank to
provide poor communities access to external insurance and credit markets
through microinsurance and microcredit initiatives have been formulated in
precisely this vein.
As development practitioners have noted, projects that are reliant on
leveraging social networks are particularly prone to corruption because they
169
are necessarily reliant on friendships and familial relationships.
Moreover, the tendency to corruption may be amplified if there is a
disproportionate reliance on local elites in decision making. Making a
related point, one commentator has written, "[T]here is an important
cultural component to corruption. Many corrupt officials do not seek to
transgress social rules; rather, the rules of their society demand that they
help family and friends before they see to the general public interest. In
170
many ways, nepotism is one of the most natural of human impulses."'
This project suffers from the same deficiency that characterizes projects that
are similarly reliant on social networks. Social networks can easily morph
into a basis for nepotism, corruption, and other forms of rent-seeking
behavior. This is particularly true where resources of social capital are
spread unequally so that certain group members have preferred access to
valuable goods and information.
In recognition of the corruption concern that inevitably accompanies
programs that leverage social networks for developmental ends, the World
Bank has developed a list of institutional design and administrative reform
recommendations. These include public articulation of the resources to be
allocated and the persons responsible for allocating them, confidential tollfree reporting hotlines for persons on the ground, protections for
whistleblowers, clearly articulated penalties for transgressions, and speedy
and transparent prosecutions. It would appear that these recommendations
would also be applicable in this context, and they have been at least
partially adopted in the Jamaica-Canada program. Transparency has turned
168. For a general discussion of the implications of corruption in guest worker programs
see PRITCHETr, supra note 7.
169. This point is particularly well made in the concluding chapter of Christiaan
Grootaert & Thierry van Bastelaer, Conclusion: Measuring Impact and Drawing Policy
Implications, in THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN DEVELOPMENT:
AN EMPIRICAL

ASSESSMENT 341, 341-50 (Christiaan Grootaert & Thierry van Bastelaer eds., 2002).
170. Francis Fukuyama, Address at the Conference on Social Capital and Poverty
Reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean: Towards a New Paradigm, Santiago, Chile
(Sept. 24-26, 2001), in Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and Development: The Coming
Agenda, in

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POVERTY REDUCTION

IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE

CARIBBEAN: TOWARDS ANEW PARADIGM 45 (Ra6l Atria et al., compilers (2004)).
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out to be a particularly helpful preventative measure. In so doing, the
Canadians have essentially made persons on the ground who are seeking
access to visas their allies in preventing corruption.
More specifically, the Jamaican government publicly advertises precisely
how many visas are available during each agricultural season and the
persons who will be providing the recommendations for participation. This
provides persons on the ground with an imperfect, but nevertheless rough,
mechanism of assessing how many persons they can expect to travel from
their own community and whether the persons who are actually selected
coincide with their rough sense of who is appropriate. In so doing, not only
are they incentivized to watch the authorities, they are also properly armed
with information. In this context, while it is difficult to prevent occasional
instances of nepotism at the periphery of the program, it would be difficult
for larger scale institutionalized corruption to take root. 17 1
3. The Exclusion of Out-Groups
Ties of kinship bind, but they also exclude. 172 A common critique of this
proposal is that it excludes those who are "network poor," namely, those
who do not have access either to a community leader or to a broader
community of persons with whom they have ongoing relationships and
whom they might be able to ask to provide testimonials as to their
reliability. If the sociological literature that investigates the pervasiveness
of whtt is alternatively characterized as "social capital" or "social
networks" in diverse poor communities is any guide, this is not likely to be
the primary concern.1 73 Because the poor in diverse societies invariably
171. Officials acknowledged a concern among Canadians that visa slots might be
awarded to politically connected persons, particularly if visas are construed by partner
government officials as a form of political patronage to reward loyal constituents.
Simultaneously, officials and guest workers expressed the view that the program appeared to
be free of the corruption that characterized other guest worker programs such as the Bracero
program. In an effort to maintain this record, officials argued that the bilateral agreements
should institutionalize the obligations to publish the numbers of visas available and persons
responsible for visa allocation, as well as the informal monitoring arrangements by Canadian
embassy officials "on the ground" in Jamaica. Officials cited the widely publicized
conviction of a minister and permanent secretary who were found to be accepting bribes for
placements in the program as evidence of the commitment to nip any problems in the bud.
For details of this conviction, see JAG Smith Loses Appeal, DAILY GLEANER (Jam.), Oct. 28,
1992, at A2; Barbara Gayle, Smith's Sentence Reduced, DAILY GLEANER (Jam.), Oct. 9,
1990, at Al.
172. Social networks can easily morph into a basis for discrimination. The reader should
be aware that this is among the questions of justice I raised in footnote 3, which will be the
subject of a later paper. In recognition of the discrimination concern that inevitably
accompanies programs that leverage social networks for developmental ends, the World
Bank has also developed a list of institutional design and administrative reform
recommendations. These include the enactment and enforcement of antidiscrimination rules,
but also in limited circumstances, the enactment and enforcement of "affirmative
discrimination" rules to mandate the inclusion of historically excluded minorities in these
programs.
173. This point is particularly
DEVELOPMENT, supra

well made

note 169, at 1-15.

in THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN
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have access to a plethora of intertwining relationships that render them
"network rich," the issue is not likely to be one of network poverty. Rather
the issue is that certain networks are privileged in relation to others.
Certain "in-groups" are able to disproportionately command access to
valuable goods and monopolize information and in so doing undermine
access for those who are not members of the "in-groups." If these "ingroups" are able to leverage their privileged access to other resources to
give them disproportionate access to visa-allocation networks, this
highlights a potential deficiency of the proposal. This section proposes a
modification to mitigate this deficiency.
a. A Modified Proposal: Self-Help Visa Groups
Persons should be allowed to form what I term "self-help visa groups"
(SHVG). These groups are self-selecting entities in which members bear
the risk of default by other members. More specifically, the penalty in the
event of default by a particular group member will be a time-limited bar on
visa applications for members of the SHVG. Through this modification, a
person seeking access to a visa need not necessarily develop a relationship
even indirectly with a community leader who is a visa screener. She simply
needs to find other persons who are similarly interested in applying for
visas and who have sufficient information about the fellow visa applicants
that they are willing to put their own visa prospects on the line.
In order to sharpen the incentives for group members to audit and
monitor their fellow group members, groups should only be allowed to
apply for visas if they are able to meet certain conditions. 174 First, they
174. The background to this suggested modification is as follows: one successful Indian
microcredit program does not allow group borrowers to access external credit unless they
have previously demonstrated that they have successfully operated a group in which
members bear the risk of default by other members. More specifically, persons are only able
to borrow if they have previously been members of ROSCAs. For a summary of the
program, see Kumar Aniket, Self Help Group Linkage Programme: A Case-Study (Nov. 15,
There is an extensive
2006), available at www.aniket.co.uk/research/casestudy.pdf.
literature from the microcredit context as to whether low-risk participants end up with lowrisk participants as partners, whether high-risk participants end up with high-risk participants
as partners, and so forth. For a good summary of this literature, see Ghatak, supra note 73.
A brief background on ROSCAs is as follows. ROSCAs provide a systematic
mechanism of pooling resources within a broad group of neighbors and friends. ROSCAs
share certain basic characteristics that are summarized as follows: a group of people gather
on a regular basis to meet; at each meeting each of the members contributes a fixed amount
to a common pot; at each meeting, this pot is given to one member of the group who is
determined either randomly or through a bidding process; this member is then unable to
receive the pot in future meetings, although she is still obliged to contribute. This process is
repeated until each member has received the pot, completing a cycle, which may or may not
begin again. ROSCA participation entails costs since members forgo the flexibility of
saving on their own, do not receive interest, and undertake the risk of default by other
members. Nevertheless in environments in which access to financial mediation is poor,
individuals join ROSCAs rather than saving on their own as a mechanism of quickly
financing the purchase of durable goods, as a commitment device against self-control
problems or as an informal mechanism of insurance (since some ROSCAs permit members
to take loans against the pot).
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must be able to provide preexisting evidence that they have previously
functioned as a group in which individuals have bome the risk of default of
other members (whether that be in relation to a loan, insurance payments,
etc.).
This innovation is based on a similar modification in the
microfinance context.
For example, in one successful microfinance
program, groups are only able to access external credit if they can provide
evidence that they have previously functioned as a group in which
individual members bear the risk of default by other members. 175 Such
groups would include informal or mutual financing arrangements that are
already pervasive in many developing countries. More specifically, persons
might be eligible if they have previously been members of ROSCAs, a form
of informal financial mediation, iterations of which have been found
worldwide.
Second, at least in the program's initial stages of administration
(certainly until it is possible to generate data sets on visa-compliance levels
that suggest that this condition should be relaxed), ideally all group
members should receive visas simultaneously and travel to similar regions.
ROSCAs are arguably the most pervasive form of informal financial mediation
among the poor in developing countries. Indeed, a broad range of studies indicate that they
are among the most prevalent forms of informal financial mediation in developing countries.
They are also prevalent among recent migrants in developed countries. One study found that
at least half of the rural residents in Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, Nigeria, Liberia, and
Togo were participants in ROSCAs. Another study found that fully 20% of the bank
deposits in the Indian state of Kerala derived from ROSCAs. Yet another study found that
roughly 20% of Taiwanese had been ROSCA participants. There is also evidence that
ROSCAs are popular in Mexico and Chile. Sixty-five percent of Jamaicans surveyed were
currently participants in a ROSCA. A good summary is contained in AGHION & MORDUCH,
supra note 164, ch. 3. The Jamaican figures are contained in Claremont Kirton, Rotating
Savings and Credit Associations in Jamaica: Some EmpiricalFindings on Partner,45 Soc.
& ECON. STUD. 195 (1996); Sudhanshi Handa & Claremont Kirton, The Economics of
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations: Evidence from the Jamaican "Partner," 60 J.
DEV. ECON. 173 (1999).
175. In the Indian microcredit program, prior to applying for access to external financing,
group members must successfully demonstrate that they belong to a ROSCA that has been
operational for some specified time period. There are strong incentives to monitor
compliance in ROSCAs since early recipients of the pot can always default, leaving later
recipients holding the bag. Indeed, it is for this reason that ROSCAs are often found to
include a formal meeting component; this provides an institutionalized mechanism of
members "checking up" that other members are on track to meet their financial
commitments. For a summary of the program, see Aniket, supra note 174.
A further innovation is that groups are only permitted to borrow if their ROSCA has
been modified from simply a saving ROSCA to a saving and borrowing ROSCA. The
primary innovation is that the savings are allowed to accumulate with a moratorium on any
member taking from the pot for some specified time period. After this time period, members
are permitted to borrow against it in accordance with a tightly structured repayment
schedule, with the interest being shared equally among all ROSCA members. If payments
are late, all members suffer reduced earnings on their contribution to the pot. In the early
stages of a group's life, given the small size of the overall pot, borrowing is generally
sequential with the order of borrowing determined by a consensus among the group
members. A ROSCA is deemed to be successful when all members receive their portion of
the pot, with no default by early takers of the pot. Successful participation in a ROSCA is
evidence that members have successfully screened their fellow group members and audited
their compliance.
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This allows the program to screen more effectively for those who have
made a credible commitment-specifically those for whom visas are
valuable and default costs are real. Notably, many informal mechanisms of
group saving or borrowing that are pervasive in developing countries
(including ROSCAs) include regular meeting components. Through these
meetings, group members are actively involved in monitoring their
neighbors, which allows them to anticipate-and sometimes head offdefault if members run into financial trouble. The aim of the proposed
condition that SHVG members receive visas and travel together is to
approximate similar conditions. Given that this program does not depend
on the oversight of a village "elder," the intuition is that group members are
more likely to be able to prevent default if they are able to actively monitor
their peers in person (as opposed to cross-border monitoring).
B. Laying the Groundworkfor the Halliburton Critique
Any proposal that advocates even the partial outsourcing of screening
and sanctioning functions, which have traditionally been considered to be at
the core of the immigration power, is likely to be controversial. In the
larger public political discourse, opponents of such measures point to what
they perceive to be instances of "outsourcing" in immigration policy, which
proved unsuccessful. 176 For example, to the extent that the government has
at least partially "outsourced" the postentry verification of immigration
documentation to employers, this system appears to have been largely
77
ineffective. 1
This critique implicates the potential disadvantages of relying on an
entity external to the United States as even a partial substitute for
performing functions that have traditionally been conceived as constituting
the core of the immigration power. Loosely speaking, in the model
proposed, the source-labor government would be acting as an "agent" for
the American government. In turn, the community-level screeners would
be acting as agents for the source-labor government. I use the term agent
broadly to mean any relationship in which one entity engages another to
perform a service under circumstances that involve delegating some
discretion over decision making to the service performer. 178 In light of the
176. The CNN commentator, Lou Dobbs, is particularly well-known for a pejorative use
of the term outsourcing generally and, more specifically, in the immigration context. See
Borowitz, supra note 53. For a similarly critical use of the term outsourcing in the
immigration context in congressional testimony, see Implementing the 9/11 Act Mandatesfor

Enhancingthe VISA Waiver Program: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Border, Maritime, and
Global Counterterrorism, 110th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Douglas E. Lavin, Regional
Vice President, International Air Transport Association).
177. See Jacoby, supra note 29.
178. In the economics literature, an agency relationship is defined as "a contract under
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to
the agent." Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). This
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likely skepticism, an examination of the incentives of the key players to
fulfill particular functions is critical to the plausibility of the proposal. The
aim of this section is in part to provide a "thin" minimalist model, which
abstracts the key features of the program from its "thicker" aspects so as to
bring into focus the incentive issue.
1. Breaking Down the Model
In its thicker form, the model involves two levels of vertical outsourcing.
First, there is the partial transfer of screening and sanctioning functions
from one state to another. The second vertical transfer of responsibilities
involves the devolution of such functions down the "food chain" from the
source-labor government to community leaders (or "intermediaries in trust"
in the model's thicker version) to individual relationships at the level of the
community.
The thickness of the model as it currently stands, with its utilization of
two levels of vertical outsourcing and the apparent importance of
intergovernmental relationships, may obscure which entities are actually
integral to screening and sanctioning. The key entities in the model are
those who have not only inside knowledge (which aids in screening), but
also individual level relationships (which aid in sanctioning).
More specifically, the persons who have inside knowledge are
community members. These persons have individual-level relationships
that allow them access to predictive information regarding the likelihood
that someone will comply with a visa that is not readily available to others,
and an accompanying ability to sanction those who do not comply with
rules. The thick model refers to these persons as intermediaries in trust. I
will refer to the community-level person with inside information as Actor
A.
In a minimalist version of the model, all that is really needed is for an
incentive to be created for Actor A to screen. To do so, one could imagine
that the model would simply create a mechanism of awarding something of
value to Actor A, while simultaneously implicitly creating a sanction by
threatening to take this valuable item away.
Consider, for example, that the entity that awards something of value is
Actor X. In the thicker model-namely, the Jamaica-Canada program as it
-currently stands-the Jamaican government performs the function of Actor
X. In the thicker model, the mechanism of awarding a prize to Actor A is
the official designation by Actor X of Actor A as a person of status in the
community. The sanction is implicit in that Actor X may "dress down"
Actor A by withdrawing the designation as a person of status. The same
definition is much broader than the common-law definition in which agency is the "fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another person
(an 'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
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point can be made with respect to sanctioning. Actor A is best placed to
sanction her fellow community members because she has the individuallevel relationships that can be leveraged to shame or stigmatize a visa
violator. Here again, Actor X simply needs to incentivize Actor A to
sanction.
There may also be devolution of this process of incentivization "down
the food chain" creating a "chain" of incentivization. For example, Actor A
may recognize that there is another person with better access to inside
information concerning a potential visa recipient. As such, in the same way
that Actor X created an incentive for Actor A, Actor A may in turn
incentivize Actor B to aid in screening. Of course, Actor B may then
engage Actor C, if Actor C has even better access to inside information.
The analogous relationship in the thicker model is when the MOL
designates a parliamentarian who then designates a local government
representative who in turn designates a community-level clergy, with each
person having even better access to inside information. Notably, Actor A
may also incentivize Actor B (and so on) as an intermediary in the
sanctioning process.
Even as there may be a "chain of incentivization," Actor X need only
deal with Actor A, with Actor A assuming responsibility for Actor B (and
Actor B assuming responsibility for Actor C, and so on). There are clear
analogies to a principal-agency relationship in contract, where Actor X
engages Actor A as the general contractor. Actor A may then choose to
engage subcontractors, but Actor A retains primary responsibility, and the
buck stops with her. 179
2. Outsourcing to a High-Level Governmental Actor
The prospect of the United States dealing with hundreds of screeners (in
what can only be described as retail as opposed to a wholesale arrangement)
imports extraordinary logistical and political challenges, particularly in a
foreign environment. 180 In light of this, it seems reasonable that the United
179. The relationship between Actor X and Actor A calls to mind a classic iterated
prisoners' dilemma, in which the game is played repeatedly. In the classic form of a
prisoners' dilemma, rational choice leads each of the two players to defect even though each
player's individual reward would be greater if she cooperated. As in broader game theory,
each player is strictly concerned with maximizing her own payoff; however, one player will
always maximize her payoff by defecting, irrespective of what the other player does. As
such, cooperation is overwhelmed by defection, so that the resulting equilibrium for the
game is for all players to defect. In contrast to a conventional prisoners' dilemma, in which
defection is always more beneficial than cooperation, in an iterated prisoners' dilemma,
which is played over several games, each player has an opportunity to sanction the other
player for prior noncooperative behavior. Cooperation may arise as an equilibrium outcome
since the incentive to defect may be outweighed by the threat of sanction. See JOEL WATSON,
STRATEGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY ch. 1 (2002) (providing a good summary

for the nontechnical reader).
180. Indeed, there are clear analogies to certain aspects of the United States' current
consular relationships. It is precisely such challenges that have led the United States to rely
heavily on outsourcing in its overseas consular arrangements. Notably, there is a burgeoning
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States would outsource these responsibilities to some sort of high-level
actor who functions in a general contractor role and assumes responsibility
for the hundreds of other actors who are necessary to this process.
Accordingly, it seems intuitively clear that a high-level actor is necessary
to the process, with the United States stipulating certain criteria for this
high-level actor to meet. Under a traditional rational choice view, the
model would work as long as it is able to create incentives for those with
inside information to screen and sanction. While a private actor may be
properly incentivized to fulfill this function utilizing particular contractual
structures and legal remedies, 181 what is less clear is that a government may
be so incentivized.
In fact, the incentives to defect may be minimized for a particular type of
governmental actor with specific traits that augment the costs of defection.
The point is not that a governmental actor may perform this function better
than a private sector entity; rather the contention is simply that, for a
particular type of governmental entity, the costs of defection may be very
high. Given the literature on comparative agency costs in government
versus the private sector,1 82 it seems counterintuitive to contend (in an
environment in which even outsourcing to the private sector is dismissed as
a "Halliburton strategy") that a foreign government may be properly
motivated to screen. On the contrary, we might think that defection is
particularly likely at the end of an outgoing administration (since the
reputation costs would be borne by the successor government).
However, under particular conditions, the bilateral arrangements between
the United States and another government may approximate a relationship
in perpetuity in which the likelihood of cooperation in any given round of
the game is high because reputational effects dominate. 183 This is
particularly true with proximate developing countries that have significant
economic, social, and national security ties with the United States, which
lead to a high degree of interdependence. This high degree of dependence
on the United States makes the cost of defection very high. This will
undermine the incentive to defect in the final round even if the bilateral
arrangement is finite.
literature on the difficulties that the United States has faced in its consular arrangements
overseas, in which commentators have noted the difficulties associated with the United
States managing myriad retail relationships in a foreign environment. See ZOLBERG, supra
note 45.
181. Richard Lewis's text contains a good general summary of such measures. See
RICHARD LEWIS, CONTRACT SURETYSHIP: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE (2000).

182. A good summary of this literature is contained in Andre Shleifer, State Versus
Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1998). See also generally Ronald A. Cass,
Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110, 1164-68 (1981); John C.
Jeffries, Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47, 72,
75-76 (1998); Daryl Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345 (2002) (acknowledging the

difficulties in incentivizing government employees, particularly low-level officials).
183. See WATSON, supra note 179, at 29-37, for a good summary for the nontechnical

reader.
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This point is borne out by an extensive literature on interstate incentives
to cooperate, which argues that classical international relations theory has
underestimated "the varieties of cooperative behavior possible within ... a

decentralized system."' 84 The contention is that classical international
relations theory (with its disproportionate focus on the threat of force in
constraining state actions), has not understood "complex interdependence"
in interstate relations in which states' interests are aligned on multiple
fronts.' 8 5 For this reason, modern states are less inclined to behave in a
noncooperative manner (i.e., defection) than has been traditionally
understood. Nowhere is this truer than in relations between proximate
developing countries and their more powerful counterparts. While one
should resist the temptation to characterize such developing countries as
"helpless pawns in the game of international relations,"' 186 their "foreign
policy and international relations are largely defined by larger, more
powerful actors and situations." 187 The incentive for a small developing
country to fulfill contractual arrangements with more powerful partners in
any given round (including a final round) is likely to be high because the
88
implicit possibilities of retaliation in multiple arenas is also high.'
3. Other Reasons for the Utilization of a Government Actor: Government
May Be Uniquely Placed to Utilize Esteem-Based Incentives
To this point, in this section, I have utilized the term incentive in the
traditional sense, namely, to connote incentives appealing to self-regarding
184. GRAHAM EVANS, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2000);
Daniel Lutzker, Internationalism as a Predictor of Cooperative Behavior, 4 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 426 (1960); Charles G. McClintlock et al., Internationalism-Isolationism,Strategy of
the Other Player, and Two-Person Game Behavior, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 631
(1963); Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Power, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 163 (1960).
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188. Notably, this is not only the case with Jamaica, but with many other developing
c6untries including the other top eight labor-exporting countries for undocumented aliens to
the United States. The other members of the "top eight" are Honduras, El Salvador,
Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. See Brotherton, supra
note 156, at 8-11. Indeed, multilateral development institutions have noted that developing
countries place great stock on the access that their nationals have to developed markets
because remittances constitute such a significant percentage of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in so many countries. This is significant because developing countries are aware that
their nationals are fungible and can be replaced with nationals from another country in a
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preferences. 189 The thick model is premised on the utilization of esteembased incentives, which are other-regarding. 190 Government officials
clearly believe that other-regarding incentives are influential in these
communities, and the interviews with subject guest workers appear to
confirm this impression. These other-regarding incentives include a desire
to be (or to be perceived as) patriotic, communal-minded, or fair. Such
incentives are sometimes loosely termed "intrinsic motivation." 19 1 The
question arises: what class of incentive might be appropriate for Actor X to
offer to Actor A?
My comments in this regard are only preliminary; this is clearly a fertile
area for further research. It is noteworthy that all of the Jamaican
government officials who were interviewed insisted that financial incentives
would not only be inappropriate, but also counterproductive. They clearly
distinguished reputational incentives from financial incentives, which were
described as crass. Moreover, the concern was that financial incentives
might simultaneously be insulting to many community leaders.
This strongly held belief is striking in light of the academic literature that
suggests that policies that are designed to exploit self-regarding preferences
to achieve public ends may sometimes undermine precisely the public ends
that they seek to augment. Surveying the literature, Samuel Bowles has
cited repeated instances of such failures when traditional policies that seek
to harness self-interest compromise what he terms "the beneficial effects of
intrinsic motivation and reciprocity[,] as well as civic 192
virtues such as a
concern for fairness and a desire to uphold social norms."
189. An individual's preference scheme is self-regarding if he or she "cares only about
the amount of goods and services that he or she consumes." DONALD E. CAMPBELL,
INCENTIVES, MOTIVATION AND THE ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION 26 (2006).
190. A definition that succinctly captures "other-regarding" preferences is as follows:
The theoretical literature on other-regarding preferences has focused on three
departures from the standard self-interest model. In addition to the material
resources allocated to him, a person may also care about: (i) The material
resources allocated to other agents in relevant reference group. (ii) The fairness of
the behavior of the relevant reference agents. (iii) The "type" of reference agents,
i.e.[,] whether the agents have selfish, altruistic, spiteful or fair-minded
preferences.
Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, The Economics of Fairness,Reciprocity and AltriusmExperimental Evidence and New Theories, in I HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING,
ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY 616, 619 (Serge-Christophe Kohm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds.,

2006).
191. Samuel Bowles, Social Preferences and Public Economics: Are Good Laws a
Substitute for Good Citizens?, in SANTA FE INSTITUTE AND UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI DI SIENA

1 (2007).
192. Id. Samuel Bowles suggests that the utilization of incentives appealing to selfregarding preferences may pervert intrinsic motivation for myriad reasons, including reasons
having to do with how incentives "frame" appropriate behavior (which he refers to in
shorthand as "framing"), how incentives communicate "information about intent or type,"
and how incentives affect perceived "self-determination." Id. at 3. With respect to
"framing," he notes that "[i]ncentives may signal appropriate behavior[,] shifting the frame
from ethical and other-regarding to instrumental and self-regarding." Id. Moreover,
"because the incentives provide a signal of the cost (to another) of the individual's behavior,
... self-regarding behavior modified by the incentive would seem appropriate behavior." Id.
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It is notable that Jamaican government interview subjects believe that
similar risks may be present in the Jamaican context. They also believe
that, because of their myriad interlocking relationships with communitylevel screeners, government is uniquely well-placed to utilize esteem-based
incentives.
CONCLUSION

Recognizing that modern aliens live increasingly transnational lives, this
Article critiques the historical uninational approach to immigration law.
The Article posits that the United States should enter into bilateral labor
agreements as a mechanism of mitigating the aforementioned asymmetry.
Under such an approach, the source-labor country could then leverage its
proximity to its nationals to aid in the process of screening and sanctioning.
Utilizing group accountability principles, the communities from which
guest workers originate, which have access to inside information about
potential guest workers, can be incentivized to aid in both the screening and
the sanctioning process. In a competitive globalized context in which
developing countries prize the access that their nationals have to the
American labor market, the repeated game-like nature of their interactions
with the United States increases the likelihood that they will meet their
screening and sanctioning commitments. Finally, this Article contends that
if visa-compliance decisions are norms-based, guest workers are more
likely to be compliant if the authorities design legal rules that augment
compliance norms that are already present in source-labor communities and
incentivize community members to reinforce them.

With respect to "information about intent or type," he notes that "[e]xplicit incentives may
provide a negative signal about the principal's type or beliefs, either in the form of lack of
concern about the agent's well being or lack of trust." Id. Finally, self-regarding incentives
may undermine perceived "self-determination" because, "where intrinsic motivation is
present, incentives may 'overjustify' the activity and reduce the individual's sense of
autonomy." Id.

Notes & Observations

